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DE-POLICING
Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards†
Critics have long claimed that when the law regulates
police behavior it inadvertently reduces officer aggressive-
ness, thereby increasing crime.  This hypothesis has taken on
new significance in recent years as prominent politicians and
law enforcement leaders have argued that increased oversight
of police officers in the wake of the events in Ferguson, Mis-
souri has led to an increase in national crime rates.  Using a
panel of American law enforcement agencies and difference-
in-difference regression analyses, this Article tests whether
the introduction of public scrutiny or external regulation is
associated with changes in crime rates.  To do this, this Article
relies on an original dataset of all police departments that
have been subject to federally mandated reform under 42
U.S.C. § 14141—the most invasive form of modern American
police regulation.  This Article finds that the introduction of
§ 14141 regulation was associated with a statistically signifi-
cant uptick in some crime rates, relative to unaffected munici-
palities.  This uptick in crime was concentrated in the years
immediately after federal intervention and diminished over
time.  This finding suggests that police departments may expe-
rience growing pains when faced with external regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
On August 12, 2013, U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin
ruled that the New York City stop-and-frisk program violated
the constitutional rights of minority residents, as it constituted
a “policy of indirect racial profiling.”1  As part of her decision,
Judge Scheindlin ordered the New York Police Department
(NYPD) to change their stop-and-frisk policy.2  She also ordered
the appointment of an external monitor to oversee mandated
1 Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-
and-frisk-practice-violated-rights-judge-rules.html [https://perma.cc/NZY7-
NTU5] (providing details about Judge Scheindlin’s ruling); see also John Cassidy,
Judge Scheindlin Stops and Frisks N.Y.C. Mayoral Candidates, NEW YORKER (Aug.
12, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2013/08/
judge-scheindlin-stops-and-frisks-ny-mayoral-candidates.html [https://perma
.cc/7HYX-5ELM] (mentioning Judge Scheindlin’s decision that stop-and-frisk
constitutes a violation of the Constitution); New York City’s ‘Stop and Frisk’ Policy
Does Violate the Constitution and Leads to ‘Indirect Racial Profiling’, Federal Judge
Rules, MAIL ONLINE (Aug. 12, 2013, 5:56 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-2390077/New-York-stop-frisk-federal-judge-Shira-Scheindlin-rules-pol-
icy-violates-constitution-orders-changes.html [https://perma.cc/DJK6-EEH2]
(explaining Judge Scheindlin’s opinion).
2 See Daniel Beekman, Ivy League Law Professors to Help Implement Stop-
and-Frisk Reforms, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 19, 2013, 2:26 AM), http://www
.nydailynews.com/news/crime/ivy-league-law-professors-implement-stop-and-
frisk-reforms-article-1.1459589 [https://perma.cc/Q2ZB-8YVY] (explaining that
a dozen academics are helping the NYPD reform its controversial stop-and-frisk
practices); J. David Goodman, Bloomberg Calls Court Monitor for Police a ‘Terrible
Idea,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/nyre-
gion/bloomberg-calls-court-monitor-for-police-a-terrible-idea.html [https://per
ma.cc/VC94-XENJ] (explaining that Mayor Bloomberg is opposed to the recom-
mendations to monitor the NYPD).
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changes to the NYPD stop-and-frisk procedures.3  Mayor
Michael Bloomberg strongly objected to the decision to appoint
a monitor, calling it a “terrible idea” and arguing that it would
be “disruptive.”4  According to Mayor Bloomberg, any court ap-
pointed monitor would not understand “the streets of New York
City.”5  Citing Philadelphia’s experience with a police depart-
ment monitor, Bloomberg also claimed that the decision could
contribute to higher crime and put the safety of all New Yorkers
at risk.6  Bloomberg and other critics of Judge Scheindlin’s
decision have argued that judicial efforts to reform police de-
partments negatively affect the department’s efficiency and ef-
fectiveness.7  No doubt, in the same period of time that the
NYPD rapidly expanded the use of stop-and-frisk, crime rates
3 See Goodman, supra note 2 (explaining the judge’s appointment of external R
monitor Peter L. Zimroth).
4 Id.; accord Yoav Gonen, De Blasio Calls NYPD’s Federal Monitor a ‘Tempo-
rary Reality,’ N.Y. POST (Sept. 20, 2013), http://nypost.com/2013/09/20/de-
blasio-calls-nypds-federal-monitor-a-temporary-reality/ [https://perma.cc/
2XD9-UT7Q] (referring to Bloomberg’s conclusion that the appointment of a mon-
itor would be “terrible”); see also Colleen Long, NYC Stop-and-Frisk Policy Wrongly
Targeted Minorities, Judge Rules; Outside Monitor Appointed, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 12,
2013, 7:40 PM), http://www.startribune.com/nypd-wrongly-targeted-minorities-
judge-rules/219252341/ [https://perma.cc/C34W-XH44] (identifying Bloomberg
as a strong critic of the decision, and citing Bloomberg’s concern that the law will
hurt crime fighting efforts).
5 Michael Howard Saul, Bloomberg Calls Stop-and-Frisk Ruling ‘Dangerous,’
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2013, 8:02 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424
127887323585604579009191911601838 [https://perma.cc/8WMS-MDTM]
(quoting Mayor Bloomberg as also criticizing the decision in part because of the
court’s failure to understand the streets of the city).
6 See Goodman, supra note 2; see also Damien Gayle, Shootings up 13% in R
New York City After Federal Judge Rules Police ‘Stop and Frisk’ Tactics Unconstitu-
tional and Racist, MAIL ONLINE (Sept. 19, 2013, 6:43 AM), http://www.dailymail
.co.uk/news/article-2425055/Shootings-10-New-York-City-federal-judge-rules-
stop-search-unconstitutional-racist.html [https://perma.cc/YHB7-KPR5] (detail-
ing how New York City officials pointed to a 13% increase in shootings over the
previous twenty-eight days as evidence that the Judge’s orders contributed to
higher crime).
7 See, e.g., Tom Howell Jr., NYC Mayor Bloomberg Staunchly Defends Stop-
and-Frisk Program, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes
.com/news/2013/aug/12/judge-says-nyc-stop-and-frisk-policy-violated-righ/
[https://perma.cc/YB7Y-QR3J] (summarizing Mayor Bloomberg’s objections to
Judge Scheindlin’s ruling); New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly Calls Stop-
and-Frisk Decision ‘Disturbing and Offensive’ (TRANSCRIPT), N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Aug. 12, 2013, 3:01 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/new-
york-police-commissioner-ray-kelly-comments-stop-and-frisk-decision-article-
1.1424689 [https://perma.cc/VG5B-GLB9] (quoting Police Commissioner Ray
Kelly, who calls the allegations made in the court case “recklessly untrue”).
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plummeted.8  But these stop-and-frisks appeared to have come
at a high and possibly unconstitutional cost.9
Mayor Bloomberg is not alone in this belief that external
regulation of police departments can hurt police efficiency and
effectiveness.  Critics have levied similar claims after the imple-
mentation of nearly all major police reforms in modern Ameri-
can history, including the exclusionary rule10 and the Miranda
8 During this time in New York City, violent crime rates fell by approximately
66% and property crime declined 62%. Uniform Crime Reporting, FBI, http://
www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr [https://perma.cc/P9WC-27UP] (searching
for data on violent crime and property crime between 1970 and 2011).
9 The proliferation of stop-and-frisks started after the United States Su-
preme Court issued the Terry v. Ohio case.  392 U.S. 1 (1968).  There, the Court
permitted a law enforcement officer to execute a limited stop-and-frisk when the
officer had reasonable suspicion that a group of individuals were engaged in
criminal activity. Id. at 30.  Since the issuance of this decision, the use of these
so-called Terry stops have raised accusations of racial profiling in cities across the
country.  And perhaps nowhere have those accusations of wrongdoing been
greater than in New York City. See generally Goldstein, supra note 1 (noting that R
Judge Scheindlin found that the police in New York were too quick to crack down
on suspicious behavior and thus watered down the meaning of a stop); Stop-and-
Frisk Data, N.Y.C.L.U., http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data
[https://perma.cc/9F6Z-UTP8] (giving a detailed breakdown of the seemingly ra-
cially disparate pattern of stop-and-frisks in New York City).  In 1990, NYPD
officers only recorded 41,438 Terry stops. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT
BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 128 (2012).
By 2011, this number had risen to an astonishing 685,724—an increase of over
1,500%.  Dylan Matthews, Here’s What You Need to Know About Stop and Frisk—
and Why the Courts Shut It Down, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/08/13/heres-what-you-need-to-
know-about-stop-and-frisk-and-why-the-courts-shut-it-down [https://perma
.cc/C5RY-CAR7].  In 2011, an estimated 87% of those subject to stop-and-frisks
were either Hispanic or African American. ZIMRING, supra note 9, at 129.  And R
these stops rarely led to an arrest or yielded illegal contraband. See Adam Serwer
& Jaeah Lee, Charts: Are the NYPD’s Stop-and-Frisks Violating the Constitution?,
MOTHER JONES (Apr. 29, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/
2013/04/new-york-nypd-stop-frisk-lawsuit-trial-charts [https://perma.cc/
Y64U-RFA3] (detailing the highly imprecise nature of stop-and-frisk in New York
City).  On average, the NYPD seizes illegal contraband once for every 143 stops of
African Americans and ninety-nine stops of Hispanics.  By contrast, when police
officers in New York City Terry stop a white suspect, they find contraband about
one in every twenty-seven cases. Id.  This means that Terry stops of Hispanic
suspects are around three to four times less accurate than stops of white sus-
pects, and Terry stops of black suspects are around five to six times less accurate.
This, according to many, is clear evidence that police officers in New York view
minorities with more suspicion than their criminality warrants.
10 See, e.g., W. ROBERT BURKHART ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A STUDY IN CALIFORNIA 10 (1982) (finding that the use of the
exclusionary rule led to prosecutors dropping complaints in 86,033 felony arrest
cases); Raymond A. Atkins & Paul H. Rubin, Effects of Criminal Procedure on
Crime Rates: Mapping Out the Consequences of the Exclusionary Rule, 46 J.L. &
ECON. 157, 159 (2003) (finding that the exclusionary rule’s passage was associ-
ated with an uptick in national crime).
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v. Arizona decision,11 just to name a few.  This de-policing hy-
pothesis has received increased attention in the wake of the
events in Ferguson, Missouri.12  Since then, a number of prom-
inent critics—including the Directors of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA)—have worried that the increased public scruti-
ny of American police departments has caused an uptick in
national crime rates.13  The media has dubbed this contem-
11 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A
Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1063–66 (1998) (linking Miranda to decreased clearance rates
in the United States); see also S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 37 (1968), as reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2123 (determining that “crime will not be effectively
abated so long as criminals who have voluntarily confessed their crimes are
released on mere technicalities”); LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS
248 (1983) (citing Nixon’s campaign speeches criticizing Miranda as a decision
that will increase crime); More Criminals to Go Free? Effect of High Court’s Ruling,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 27, 1966, at 32, 33 (quoting the Los Angeles Mayor
as saying the Miranda decision would handcuff police and contribute to more
criminals going free).
12 For more information on the events in Ferguson, Missouri, see Julie Bos-
man & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Grief and Protests Follow Shooting of a Teenager,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/us/police-
say-mike-brown-was-killed-after-struggle-for-gun.html [https://perma.cc/PSU2-
84EA] (providing details on the Michael Brown shooting); see also Devlin Barrett,
Justice Department to Investigate Ferguson Police Force, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 4, 2014,
4:54 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ferguson-police-chief-welcomes-justice-
department-probe-1409849928 [https://perma.cc/PWQ8-CUU6] (stating that
the DOJ opened its investigation of Ferguson on September 5, 2014—less than a
month after the Brown shooting).
13 For just a few examples, see Heather Mac Donald, The New Nationwide
Crime Wave, WALL ST. J. (May 29, 2015, 6:27 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
the-new-nationwide-crime-wave-1432938425 [https://perma.cc/8XWA-8T7W]
[hereinafter Nationwide Crime Wave] (tying the uptick in national crime rates to
the introduction of additional scrutiny of police after Ferguson); Heather Mac
Donald, Trying to Hide the Rise of Violent Crime, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 25, 2015, 1:09
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/trying-to-hide-the-rise-of-violent-crime-1451
066997 [https://perma.cc/RMY9-77SN] (connecting crime rates to police scru-
tiny); Heather Mac Donald, The Ferguson Effect in Los Angeles— More Crime, L.A.
TIMES (Jan 13, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
mac-donald-ferguson-effect-in-los-angeles-20160113-story.html [https://perma
.cc/B5A9-HCXE] (looking specifically at Los Angeles as an example of where scru-
tiny contributed to an uptick in crime); Mike Pesca, Grasping for the Ferguson
Effect, SLATE (June 8, 2015, 8:26 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/podcasts/
gist/2015/06/the_gist_heather_mac_donald_on_the_ferguson_effect_and_crime
_statistics.html [https://perma.cc/SG2G-X4HG].  For details on the statements
made by the FBI and DEA Directors, see Todd C. Frankel, DEA Chief Joins FBI
Chief in Giving Credence to ‘Ferguson Effect,’ WASH. POST (Nov 4, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/11/04/dea-chief-joins-
fbi-chief-in-giving-credence-to-ferguson-effect [https://perma.cc/R7WE-BCQB]
(quoting the DEA Director as making such a de-policing claim); Wesley Lowery,
FBI Chief Again Says Ferguson Having Chilling Effect on Law Enforcement, WASH.
POST (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fbi-chief-again-
says-ferguson-having-chilling-effect-on-law-enforcement/2015/10/26/c51011d
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porary version of the de-policing hypothesis the “Ferguson
[E]ffect.”14
If true, the de-policing hypothesis has serious implications
for the study of police regulation.  It suggests that attempts to
document, oversee, and regulate unconstitutional misconduct
by American police departments may reduce public safety.  If
true, this hypothesis should make courts and legislatures hesi-
tant to install aggressive regulations of police behavior.  Until
recently, however, social scientists have been somewhat lim-
ited in their ability to test this hypothesis.15
Using a panel of American law enforcement agencies and
difference-in-difference regression analyses, this Article tests
whether the introduction of public scrutiny and external regu-
lation is associated with changes in crime rates.  To do this,
this Article relies on an original dataset of all police depart-
ments that have been subject to federally mandated reform
under 42 U.S.C. § 14141,16 acquired via Freedom of Informa-
4-7c2c-11e5-afce-2afd1d3eb896_story.html [https://perma.cc/VAF7-TLC6] (dis-
cussing Director Comey’s speech at the University of Chicago and quoting his
claims that police officers are becoming more passive).
14 Members of the media from both sides of the debate have taken to describ-
ing this hypothesis as the “Ferguson Effect.” See, e.g., Sari Horwitz, Attorney
General: There Is ‘No Data’ Backing Existence of a ‘Ferguson Effect,’ WASH. POST
(Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
loretta-lynch-there-is-no-data-backing-the-existence-of-a-ferguson-effect/2015/
11/17/ebac5f1a-8d56-11e5-acff-673ae92ddd2b_story.html [https://perma.cc/
H7EN-MQ9X] (using this label); Eric Lichtblau, Officials Debate Whether ‘Fergu-
son Effect’ Is Real, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/
05/us/politics/officials-debate-effect-of-scrutiny-on-police.html [https://perma
.cc/M8JZ-2WQQ] (also using the label); Johnathan M. Smith, Forget the ‘Fergu-
son Effect’ on Crime, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/posteverything/wp/2015/10/28/forget-the-ferguson-effect-on-crime
[https://perma.cc/TV4M-QRY3] (also using the label).
15 This is because most major reforms of American law enforcement have
happened through piecemeal case law handed down by courts.  This regulatory
approach has made it difficult to test the validity of the de-policing hypothesis for
two reasons.  First, when the U.S. Supreme Court handed down transformational
regulations of American law enforcement like Miranda or Mapp v. Ohio, their
decisions bound all state and local law enforcement agencies equally.  This made
it impossible for researchers to compare a police agency burdened by Miranda or
Mapp with a similarly situated police department unburdened by these decisions
over the same time period.  Put differently, it has previously been difficult for
researchers to engage in contemporaneous, cross-departmental comparisons be-
tween police departments.  Second, most of the regulations handed down by
courts have only regulated one small aspect of police work.  Because of this, it was
difficult to casually link any corresponding increases in crime rates to the intro-
duction of piecemeal reforms of local police practices.  Until recently, we have
lacked an ideal way to test the theoretical assumptions underlying the de-policing
hypothesis.  For a more detailed account of these prior limitations, see infra sub-
parts I.B, II.A.
16 See infra subparts II.C, II.D.
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tion Act (FOIA) requests, interviews with relevant stakeholders,
and a review of available court documents.17  Passed in 1994,
§ 14141 gives the U.S. Attorney General the power to seek equi-
table relief against local police departments engaged in a pat-
tern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct.18  This unique
dataset facilitates an examination of two different versions of
the de-policing hypothesis.  One version of the de-policing hy-
pothesis argues that the mere presence of public scrutiny is
enough to increase crime rates.19  The other version of the de-
17 For more information on the methodology used to collect this original
dataset, see Appendix F.
18 Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 14141 as part of the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (VCCLEA).  Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 210401, 108
Stat. 1796, 2071 (1994).  The statute makes it unlawful for a police department to
engage in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct.  42 U.S.C.
§ 14141(a) (2012).  The statute gives the U.S. Attorney General the authority to
seek injunctive relief to force police agencies to implement reforms aimed at
curbing misconduct.  42 U.S.C. § 14141(b).  Federally mandated reform via
§ 14141 represents the single most invasive form of external legal regulation
imposed on American police departments.  Theoretically, each agreement should
be specifically tailored to the unique needs of the individual police department—
that is, tailored to the type of misconduct that must be rooted out.  However, these
agreements have actually looked remarkably similar over time.  Most agreements
have included sections regulating the officer use of force. See, e.g., Settlement
Agreement and Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution [hereinafter Seattle
Agreement] at 16–40, United States v. City of Seattle, No. 2:12-cv-01282-JLR,
(W.D. Wash. July 27, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/
spd_consentdecree_7-27-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AXG-R7PX] (detailing regu-
lations on use of firearms, conductive energy devices, oleoresin capsicum spray,
and impact weapons).  Almost all agreements require the implementation of an
early warning system to identify officers engaged in a systematic misconduct.
See, e.g., Joint Application for Entry of Consent Decree [hereinafter New Jersey
Consent Decree] at 15–18, ¶¶ 40–56, United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-
5970(MLC) (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1999), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/pub-
lic/PN-NJ-0002-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/C63C-N2LU] (requiring the imple-
mentation of an early warning system which will be used to assist State Police
supervisors “to promote professionalism and civil rights integrity, to identify and
modify potentially problematic behavior, and to promote best practices”).  It is
common for agreements to regulate the handling of citizen complaints and the
internal investigation of officer wrongdoing. See, e.g., Consent Decree [hereinafter
Pittsburgh Consent Decree] at 23–32, ¶¶ 44–69, United States v. City of Pitts-
burgh, No. 2:97-cv-00354-RJC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 1997), http://www.clearing-
house.net/chDocs/public/PN-PA-0003-0002.pdf [https://perma.cc/HC4Z-
BJ5S] (mandating such reforms).  In recent years, though, the Department of
Justice under President Barack Obama has expanded the scope of structural
police reform to cover a wide range of topics, including gender bias, interroga-
tions, lineup procedures, recruitment, crisis intervention, and promotion stan-
dards. See Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police
Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1387 (2015).
19 See infra subpart I.A and accompanying text (describing this as the “Fergu-
son Effect”).
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policing hypothesis ties increases in crime to the imposition of
external regulation.20
Federal intervention via § 14141 allows for a testing of the
theoretical assumptions underlying both versions of the de-
policing hypothesis. When the Department of Justice (DOJ)
identifies a local police department as a target for § 14141 re-
form, it first initiates a formal investigation.21  These formal
investigations are public and can last for a year or more.22
During these investigatory periods, the DOJ puts local police
departments under intense public scrutiny.23  However, during
this initial investigatory period, the DOJ does not mandate any
formal changes to departmental policy—it merely identifies the
department’s behavior as suspicious.24  This Article identified
sixty-one formal investigations of American police departments
pursuant to § 14141 since 1994.25  This Article uses data from
20 See infra subpart I.B and accompanying text (describing this as “Drive-
and-Wave Syndrome”).
21 Technically, the DOJ first initiates a preliminary inquiry before it opens a
formal investigation.  But these preliminary inquiries are not made public.  Pre-
liminary inquiries generally involve the DOJ examining publicly available infor-
mation to determine whether a police department may warrant a full-scale public
investigation.  For more information on how these preliminary inquiries operate,
see Rushin, supra note 18, at 1367–72 (providing a detailed account of how the R
DOJ identifies agencies for preliminary inquiries and showing that only a fraction
of preliminary inquiries become formal investigations).
22 See id. at 1370–71 (“Investigations are expensive and time-consuming—
sometimes costing millions of dollars and taking several months or even years to
complete.”) (citations omitted).
23 For a vivid example of the kind of public scrutiny a police department can
face in the wake of a formal investigation being announced by the DOJ pursuant
to § 14141, consider the ongoing investigation of the Chicago Police Department.
In the wake of the Laquan McDonald shooting, the DOJ has initiated a formal
investigation of the Chicago Police Department, which has resulted in significant
media attention and even pressure on Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel. See
Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Justice Officials to Investigate Chicago Police De-
partment After Laquan McDonald Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2015), http://www
.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/us/justice-dept-expected-to-investigate-chicago-po-
lice-after-laquan-mcdonald-case.html [https://perma.cc/3JRK-VK82] (raising
questions from critics after the DOJ formal investigation announcement about
whether the Mayor’s office did enough to address the shooting of Laquan McDon-
ald); Dan Roberts et al., Chicago Mayor ‘Welcomes’ US Justice Department Inquiry
into Police Practices, GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/dec/07/justice-department-investigation-chicago-police [https://
perma.cc/FZ46-3834] (describing Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel as
“[b]eleaguered” in light of the apparent misconduct in the shooting of Laquan
McDonald and the subsequent federal investigation).
24 The DOJ does not demand any reforms until it can identify a pattern or
practice of misconduct in violation of the underlying statute.  For more informa-
tion on this entire process, see generally Rushin, supra note 18, at 1366–96 R
(recounting the structural reform litigation process from beginning to end).
25 See Sarah Childress et al., Fixing the Force, PBS FRONTLINE, http://apps
.frontline.org/fixingtheforce [https://perma.cc/84VK-62F9] (showing a complete
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these agencies to test whether the introduction of public scru-
tiny is associated with de-policing.
If the DOJ concludes that a local police department is en-
gaged in a pattern of unconstitutional misconduct in violation
of § 14141, the DOJ will then typically negotiate a settlement
with the targeted police department.26  These settlements are
sweeping.27  They represent the single most invasive form of
external regulation of local police departments.28  They require
police departments to make substantial changes to internal
oversight measures, officer training, disciplinary procedures,
and more.29  These agreements bind local law enforcement
list of all § 14141 investigations until the end of 2015); see also Stephen Rushin,
Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 3244–46 app. A
(2014) (showing a complete list of all § 14141 investigations through 2013).
26 See Rushin, supra note 18, at 1372 (“After the DOJ has completed its R
internal investigatory phases, [§ 14141 reform] advances to the negotiation stage.
During this phase, the DOJ spends anywhere from a few months to a few years
negotiating over the types of reforms that a police agency ought to make to avoid
full-scale litigation . . . .”).  But negotiation is not always successful. See, e.g.,
Matt Ford, United States v. Ferguson, ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www
.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/doj-ferguson-lawsuit/462300
[https://perma.cc/928J-HU4N] (describing how negotiations between the DOJ
and the Ferguson Police Department broke down, resulting in the DOJ filing a suit
against the troubled agency).
27 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing in detail the different R
components of a normal settlement in a § 14141 case).
28 Historically, the United States has regulated police misconduct through a
range of minimally invasive measures.  The exclusionary rule prevents prosecu-
tors from using some evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution. See Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–57 (1961) (applying this so-called exclusionary rule to
all police officers, including those at the state-level).  Federal law also permits
private individuals to bring civil lawsuits against police officers that violate their
constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).  And in some cases, aggrieved
victims of police misconduct can also bring suits against police departments or
municipalities. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658,
695–701 (1978) (overruling the Court’s precedent that had protected municipali-
ties from suit under § 1983); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388
(1989) (explaining that a state agent employer may be liable for the actions of an
employee under § 1983 if the employer’s policy or practice was deliberately indif-
ferent to the likelihood that a constitutional violation would occur).  Finally, the
federal government maintains the legal authority to file federal criminal charges
against a police officer who willfully deprives a person of their constitutional
rights.  18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012).  While each of these can help reduce misconduct,
they ultimately permit police departments to continue to violate constitutional
rights, as long as they are willing to pay the price.  That is, as long as a police
department is willing to pay the costs associated with litigation or the costs of
evidentiary exclusion, these measures cannot force such an agency to adopt
proactive reforms.  In contract terms, they permit efficient breaches by police
departments. See Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures,
and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970) (defining and ex-
plaining the concept of efficient breach in the context of contract law).
29 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. R
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agencies for around five to ten years.30  Between 1994 and
2016, the DOJ reached thirty-one such settlements.31  Thus,
this Article uses data from these agencies to test whether the
introduction of external regulation is associated with de-
policing.
While this Article finds little evidence that scrutiny contrib-
uted to higher crime rates, it concludes that the introduction of
external regulations is associated with a statistically significant
uptick in crime rates in affected jurisdictions.32  This uptick in
crime was concentrated in the years immediately after federal
intervention and diminishes to statistical insignificance over
time.33  This finding is consistent with accusations levied by
police unions and law enforcement leaders.34  It appears that
external regulation of American police departments may come
with some costly growing pains.  Based on these findings, this
Article concludes by offering some normative recommendations
for how policymakers could more effectively regulate local po-
lice departments.  It argues that policymakers could solicit
feedback from frontline police officers before implementing in-
vasive regulations, in hopes of obtaining organizational buy-in
and minimizing these growing pains.35
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I describes the
theoretical basis for the de-policing hypothesis.  This Part elab-
orates two different versions of the de-policing hypothesis lev-
ied by critics in the past—one that links de-policing to mere
scrutiny and the other that links de-policing to external regula-
tion.  Part II details the methodology for this study.  In doing so,
Part II describes the history of § 14141 and explains why this
statute provides a unique opportunity to test both versions of
the de-policing hypothesis.  This Part also breaks down the
empirical methodology, variables, and controls used in this Ar-
ticle.  Part III describes the findings from the study.  And Part
30 Rushin, supra note 18, at 1392 fig.5 (showing the average length of these R
settlements, ranging from as little as 5.0 years in Cincinnati, Ohio, and Prince
George’s County, Maryland, to as long as 10.7 years in Washington, D.C. and 11.9
years in Los Angeles, California).
31 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. R
32 See infra Part III (showing in Figures 3 through 7 a slight uptick in overall
crime rates in cities targeted for federal intervention).
33 See infra Part III (showing in Figures 8 and 9 that this uptick in crime is
concentrated in the early years of federal intervention).
34 For a detailed rundown of these critiques by police unions and other police
leaders, see infra sections I.B.1, I.B.2 (describing the “Ferguson Effect” and
“Drive-and-Wave” hypotheses).
35 See infra subpart IV.B.
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IV discusses the implications of these findings and offers nor-
mative recommendations.
I
THE DE-POLICING HYPOTHESIS
On October 23, 2015, James B. Comey, Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), gave a speech at the
University of Chicago Law School discussing the recent surge
in violent crimes in the nation’s fifty largest cities.36  Director
Comey wondered aloud, “What could be driving an increase in
murder in some cities across all regions of the country, all at
the same time?”37  His answer would reignite a national debate
about the effects of police oversight.38  According to Director
Comey, the cause of this crime spike may be the increased
reluctance of police officers to police the streets proactively.39
In the era of YouTube, viral videos, and cellphone cameras,
Director Comey worried that many police officers feel “under
siege,” and thus “don’t feel much like getting out of [their]
cars.”40  The result, speculates Comey, is a “chill wind blowing
through American law enforcement over the last year . . .
that . . . is surely changing behavior.”41  While controversial,
Comey is not the first to argue that scrutiny, oversight, or
regulation of American law enforcement may contribute to de-
policing.
Throughout American history, critics have expressed simi-
lar concerns.  For example, after the implementation of the
exclusionary rule42 and the Miranda v. Arizona decision,43 crit-
ics similarly worried that police facing additional scrutiny or
oversight would engage in de-policing.  And long before the
36 James B. Comey, Dir. FBI, Law Enforcement and the Communities We
Serve: Bending the Lines Toward Safety and Justice, Remarks at the University of
Chicago Law School (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/law-
enforcement-and-the-communities-we-serve-bending-the-lines-toward-safety-
and-justice [https://perma.cc/7FH4-NT96] [hereinafter Comey Speech at the
University of Chicago] (“Most of America’s 50 largest cities have seen an increase
in homicides and shootings this year, and many of them have seen a huge in-
crease.  These are cities with little in common except being American cities—
places like Chicago, Tampa, Minneapolis, Sacramento, Orlando, Cleveland, and
Dallas.”).
37 Id.
38 See, e.g., Lowery, supra note 13 (discussing reactions to speeches made by R
Director Comey).
39 Comey Speech at the University of Chicago, supra note 36. R
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
43 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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current, partisan debate about Comey’s statements, the de-
policing hypothesis had been a source of political wrangling.  In
1968, the Senate debated the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, which attempted to repeal Miranda.44  Dur-
ing the debates, Senator John McClellan argued that Supreme
Court cases like Miranda and Escobedo v. Illinois45 hurt law
enforcement and caused crime to spiral “upward and upward
and upward.”46  In May of that year, Republican Presidential
Candidate Richard Nixon released a “well-received position pa-
per on crime” entitled Toward Freedom from Fear.47  In it,
Nixon cited the 88% increase in crime in the United States
during the 1960s and bluntly pinned the blame for this crime
increase on court decisions designed to reform police
departments.48
It is safe to say that the de-policing hypothesis did not start
with Director Comey’s statements.  His statements were just
the latest iteration of a long history of scholars, politicians, and
pundits worrying that scrutiny and oversight handcuff police
officer effectiveness.  Within the academic literature and public
discourse, this phenomenon has taken on many different
names including “passive law enforcement,” “selective disen-
44 See Yale Kamisar, How to Use, Abuse—and Fight Back With—Crime Statis-
tics, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 239, 240 (1972).
45 378 U.S. 478, 490–91 (1964) (holding that criminal suspects had a right to
counsel during police interrogations under the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution).
46 Kamisar, supra note 44, at 240.  Senator McClellan also welcomed listen- R
ers to “weep for your country” since these cases had “set a low tone in law
enforcement.”
47 Id. at 241.
48 See id. (“The Miranda and Escobedo decisions of the high court have had
the effect of seriously hamstringing the peace forces in our society and strength-
ening the criminal forces.”).  Of course, these jarring crime statistics often grossly
misrepresented the size of the crime epidemic during the time period.  Often,
these alleged increases in crime were nothing more than efforts by law enforce-
ment to more accurately and thoroughly record reported crimes.  For example,
Kamisar explains:
When, upon taking command of the Chicago Police Department in
1960, Orlando Wilson drastically revamped the department’s
method of reporting crime and maintaining records, he warned that
the new system’s more accurate reporting would create the impres-
sion of a “crime wave.”  A common practice of the pre-Wilson era, for
example, was for a commander to ignore a lot of crime in order “to
save work and make the district look better on paper.”  When, more
than a full year after his new system of reporting went into effect,
Chicago crime continued to rise, Wilson had a ready explanation: a
massive publicity campaign to call the police at a new central num-
ber when crime occurred—and increased confidence in the police—
had encouraged people to report crimes they would not have re-
ported in the past.
Id. at 243.
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gagement,” “tactical detachment,” or officer “retreat.”49  Critics
have worried that police officers will respond by de-policing
when faced with allegations of racial profiling,50 riots,51 civil
suits,52 or federal consent decrees.53
Within the legal literature, the de-policing hypothesis has
received the greatest attention in the context of racial profiling
cases.54  For example, in Gacina v. State, a New Jersey Supe-
rior Court articulated the de-policing concern as “officers, on
their own, [who] decide to stop taking pro-active steps to en-
49 Willard M. Oliver, Depolicing: Rhetoric or Reality?, CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV.,
May 2015, at 1, 2.
50 See Frank Rudy Cooper, The “Seesaw Effect” from Racial Profiling to De-
policing: Toward a Critical Cultural Theory, in THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS RESEARCH: A
CONSTITUTIVE APPROACH 139, 147–48 (Benjamin Fleury-Steiner & Laura Beth Niel-
sen eds., 2006); Frank Rudy Cooper, Understanding “Depolicing”: Symbiosis The-
ory and Critical Cultural Theory, 71 UMKC L. REV. 355, 361 (2002).
51 The response of some officers after the Los Angeles riots is demonstrative of
this argument.  As one Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officer observed,
some of the older officers “are so angry and frustrated by events surrounding the
Rodney King video that they have all but given up on doing any effective police
work.  Many of them will only respond to radio calls, and that they do slowly.”
Oliver, supra note 49, at 4.  Similar claims were made by officers in the wake of the R
Cincinnati riots after the shooting of Timothy Thomas in 2001.  According to one
report, arrests dropped by 50% in the three months after the Thomas shooting,
and traffic stops fell by 55%. Id.  There is also some evidence that the Cincinnati
Fraternal Order of Police (the union for Cincinnati police officers) actually advo-
cated for officers to pull back on enforcement, telling officers:
If you want to make 20 traffic stops a shift and chase every dope
dealer you see, go right ahead.  Just remember that if something
goes wrong, or you make the slightest mistake in that split second,
it could result in having your worst nightmare come true for you and
your family, and City Hall will sell you out.
Id.
52 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Novak et al., Strange Bedfellows: Civil Liability and
Aggressive Policing, 26 POLICING 352, 362–65 (2003) (arguing that despite accusa-
tions that civil litigation may decrease officer aggressiveness, empirical examina-
tions reveal that civil litigation is actually a weak and inconsistent predictor of
such de-policing behavior).
53 See, e.g., ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., TURNING NECESSITY INTO VIRTUE 48–58
(2002), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/html/cd_rom/inaction1/pubs/TurningNe
cessityintoVirtue.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DMK-DY9B] [hereinafter TURNING NE-
CESSITY INTO VIRTUE] (identifying the depolicing hypothesis as a concern expressed
by frontline officers in Pittsburgh during and after federal intervention); ROBERT C.
DAVIS ET AL., CAN FEDERAL INTERVENTION BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLIC-
ING? THE PITTSBURGH CONSENT DECREE 42 (2005), https://www.vera.org/publica
tions/can-federal-intervention-bring-lasting-improvement-in-local-policing-the-
pittsburgh-consent-decree [https://perma.cc/2P3Q-39FL] [hereinafter CAN FED-
ERAL INTERVENTION BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING?] (again expressing
concern about possible de-policing effects of federal intervention).
54 See Oliver, supra note 49, at 5, 8 (noting that de-policing “has received little R
attention in the academic literature” but “has found its way into case law” as a
result of its “connection to racial profiling”).
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gage citizens.”55  Similarly, in United States v. Hare, “a state
trooper admitted in court that he typically engaged in depolic-
ing and the only reason he stopped the defendant, a Black
male, was because he had cut the trooper and another car off
when illegally changing lanes.”56  He further testified that he
sometimes felt compelled to not stop minority drivers who had
committed traffic violations to avoid “being perceived as a ra-
cist.”57  Over time, scholars have used de-policing to describe a
wide range of circumstances.58  But at its core, the modern
articulation of the de-policing hypothesis describes the possi-
bility that police may “disengag[e] from active police work as a
reaction to a negative experience.”59
The two subparts that follow distinguish between two dis-
tinct versions of the de-policing hypothesis.  Subpart A de-
scribes the so-called Ferguson Effect, which connects external
scrutiny to reductions in officer aggressiveness and subse-
quent increases in crime.  Subpart B details a slightly different
version of the de-policing hypothesis, which suggests that of-
55 Id. at 5 (quoting Lewis R. Katz, “Lonesome Road”: Driving Without the
Fourth Amendment, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1413, 1421 (2013)).
56 Id. at 5–6.
57 Id. at 6.
58 Oliver explains that Donald Black and M.P. Baumgartner appear to be the
first academics to use the term “depolicing.”  But they used the word in a slightly
different way.  They argued that “if police protection were reduced . . . the volume
and intensity of self-help would rise correspondingly.” Id. at 3.  Thus, they used
the term to describe the “cutting back on the police—or depolicing” as a way to
facilitate more self-help. Id.  (quoting Donald Black & M.P. Baumgartner, On Self-
Help in Modern Society, 12 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 33, 34–35 (1987)).  Obvi-
ously, this definition does not fit with how modern scholars use this term.  In
1998, George L. Kelling and William Bratton both used the term to describe
something more similar to how the term is used today.  Oliver explains their de-
policing arguments:
Kelling and Bratton have, both separately and together, made the
argument that America had already witnessed depolicing and the
outcome was one that had a deleterious effect on society.  Specifi-
cally, they point to the reduction in police officers in the 1970s,
coming on the heels of the findings of the Kansas City Preventive
Patrol Report by, ironically, Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, and Brown.
This occurred at a time when cities were facing the 1970s recession
and budget cuts, while contemporaneously having to manage in-
creased calls-for-service because of the widespread implementation
of 9-1-1.  Police departments failed to replace officers in the wake of
attrition believing they did not deter crime on routine patrol, only to
then discover the need for more officers to answer the increased
calls-for-service.  Kelling argued that there were “tragic conse-
quences of depolicing city streets,” specifically as it related to “the
crime problem.”
Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting George L. Kelling, Perspectives on Crime
and Justice: 1997-1998 Lecture Series (1998)).
59 Id. at 4.
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ficers facing stringent external regulation will not engage in
proactive street policing, thereby contributing to an increase in
crime.  These subparts also consider some of the available liter-
ature on both versions of these de-policing hypotheses.
A. The De-Policing Effects of Public Scrutiny
Some allege that increases in public scrutiny make police
less aggressive, thereby increasing crime.60  Various media
outlets have labeled this hypothesis the Ferguson Effect.61  Not
only has FBI Director Comey articulated some version of this
hypothesis,62 so too has the head of the Drug Enforcement
Agency, Chuck Rosenberg, who argued that police today are
changing their behavior “rightly or wrongly” because of a per-
ception that they may become the subject of “the next viral
video.”63  This hypothesis links the mere presence of public
scrutiny—not necessarily regulation—to de-policing.  Public
scrutiny can take many forms, including press coverage, public
protests, or the video recording of police officers.64
Scholars have disagreed about whether external scrutiny
contributes to de-policing.  Scott E. Wolfe and Justin Nix have
argued that negative publicity may have made police officers
less likely to engage in community partnerships.65  Willard M.
Oliver used a convenience sample of twenty-five officers to un-
derstand the nature, scope, and causes of de-policing.66  That
study found a widespread belief among American police officers
60 See Lowery, supra note 13. R
61 See, e.g., Christine Byers, Crime Up After Ferguson and More Police Needed,
Top St. Louis Area Chiefs Say, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 15, 2014), http://
www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/crime-up-after-ferguson-and-
more-police-needed-top-st/article_04d9f99f-9a9a-51be-a231-1707a57b50d6
.html [https://perma.cc/JH2E-NXHE] (quoting Chief Sam Dotson as using the
term “Ferguson [E]ffect,” one of the earliest documented cases of the term appear-
ing in popular media); Kevin Johnson, Providence One of Many U.S. Police Forces
Feeling Ferguson Aftershocks, USA TODAY (Dec. 28, 2015, 9:39 PM), http://www
.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/12/28/providence-police-force-fergu
son-effect-aftershocks/77005198/ [https://perma.cc/DY7M-L6QN] (using the
term “Ferguson Effect”).
62 See Lowery, supra note 13. R
63 Frankel, supra note 13. R
64 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  Supporters of the “Ferguson R
Effect” thesis have linked the recent increase in the national murder rate to this
sort of heightened public scrutiny. See Nationwide Crime Wave, supra note 13. R
65 Scott E. Wolfe & Justin Nix, The Alleged “Ferguson Effect” and Police Will-
ingness to Engage in Community Partnership, 40 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 1–2 (2016)
(using a cross-sectional survey of 567 deputies at an agency in the southeastern
United States to reach the conclusion that “officers who have confidence in their
authority or perceive their agency as fair are more willing to partner with the
community to solve problems, regardless of the effects of negative publicity”).
66 Oliver, supra note 49, at 1. R
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that public accusations of racial profiling, among other exter-
nal stimuli, can contribute to de-policing.67  Similarly, a study
by Richard Rosenfeld and the Sentencing Project found some
support for this version of the de-policing hypothesis.68  Rosen-
feld specifically looked at data on crime rates in St. Louis before
and after the Michael Brown shooting.  He found a “double-
digit homicide increas[e] in St. Louis.”69  While such a startling
increase “should not be discounted,” he was careful to con-
clude that this was not necessarily the result of increased scru-
tiny on police officers.70  A more sweeping study conducted by
David Pyrooz et al. found that robbery rates may have in-
creased in the wake of Ferguson.71  Ultimately, though, that
study failed to find any other definitive evidence that the intro-
duction of heightened police scrutiny after Ferguson caused an
increase in crime across eighty-one large American cities.72
Overall, the available literature suggests that external scrutiny
may contribute to de-policing—but the evidence is limited at
best.
B. The De-Policing Effects of External Regulation
Another derivation of the de-policing hypothesis alleges
that the introduction of externally mandated legal regulation
causes police to be less aggressive, thereby emboldening
criminals and increasing crime.73  According to this hypothe-
sis, police officers facing new forms of external regulation will
shy away from engaging in proactive street policing.74  In some
cases, external legal regulation may contribute to officers hesi-
67 Id. at 9–17 (discussing the results of his interviews and providing detailed
accounts of officers alleging the negative effects of de-policing).
68 RICHARD ROSENFELD, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, WAS THERE A “FERGUSON EF-
FECT” ON CRIME IN ST. LOUIS? (2015), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/09/Ferguson-Effect.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3DX-T9RD].
69 Id. at 3.
70 Id. at 3–4 (“In the absence of credible and comprehensive evidence, sound-
ing alarm bells over a ‘Ferguson [E]ffect’ or any other putative cause will not
help.”).  This sort of caution is in order, as the Rosenfeld study did not consider
any alternative explanations for this increase in crime.
71 David C. Pyrooz et al., Was There a Ferguson Effect on Crime Rates in Large
U.S. Cities?, 46 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 1 (2016) (stating that “disaggregated analyses
revealed that robbery rates, declining before Ferguson, increased in the months
after Ferguson”).
72 Id. at 4 (“After the shooting of Michael Brown, and the subsequent social
unrest and social media responses, was there a systematic change in crime trends
in large U.S. cities?  We find no evidence in support of this contention.”).
73 See CAN FEDERAL INTERVENTION BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLIC-
ING?, supra note 53, at 21. R
74 See id. at 22 (showing in Figure 7 that 79% of officers have been less
proactive in approaching their jobs).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-3\CRN301.txt unknown Seq: 17 28-MAR-17 10:05
2017] DE-POLICING 737
tating to use necessary force.75  This “hesitation might end up”
getting an officer “killed or assaulted.”76  As the Pittsburgh Bu-
reau of Police was undergoing federally mandated legal reform
to curb unconstitutional misconduct, officers reported feeling
“hesitant to intervene in situations involving conflict because
they were afraid of having a citizen file an unwarranted anony-
mous complaint against them . . . .”77  Roughly three out of
every four Pittsburgh officers shared this viewpoint.78  A high
proportion of officers in that department reported that the
threat of community complaints and heightened disciplinary
action after federally mandated reforms contributed to less
proactive street policing.79  And in Washington, D.C., police
union officials alleged that measures designed to combat mis-
conduct require additional paperwork, which prevent officers
from spending time on the streets fighting crime.80  Some have
colloquially labeled this the  “Drive-and-Wave Syndrome”81—
suggesting that when faced with burdensome regulation, police
officers will choose to stay in their squad cars rather than
interact with the public.
Like the Ferguson Effect, the available literature on the
link between external regulation and de-policing is mixed.
Christopher Stone et al. found that external regulation of the
Los Angeles Police Department did not appear to coincide with
any increases in crime or decreases in police aggressiveness.82
75 Timothy Williams, Long Taught to Use Force, Police Warily Learn to De-
Escalate, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2015, at A16.
76 Id. (quoting Harvey Hedden, the executive director of the International Law
Enforcement Educators and Trainers Association).
77 CAN FEDERAL INTERVENTION BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING?,
supra note 53, at 16. R
78 See id. at 21.
79 CHRISTOPHER STONE ET AL., POLICING LOS ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT DECREE:
THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD 20 (2009), http://www.lapdonline.org/
assets/pdf/Harvard-LAPD%20Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3DC-943S] (show-
ing in Figure 10 that a high proportion of LAPD officers believed that the threat of
community complaints would hurt proactive street policing).
80 See Joshua M. Chanin, Negotiated Justice? The Legal, Administrative, and
Policy Implications of ‘Pattern or Practice’ Police Misconduct Reform  (2011) (un-
published Ph.D dissertation, American University) (on file with authors) (quoting a
leader from the Washington, D.C. Police Union as saying that structural police
reform leads to more time-consuming paperwork).
81 STONE ET AL., supra note 79, at 19–20. R
82 Like in the other similar studies, LAPD officers “frequently” raised concerns
about how federal intervention hampered their abilities to exercise discretion,
commonly saying that paperwork deterred them from making arrests and arguing
that compliance with the terms of the decree hurt their ability to proactively fight
crime on the streets. Id. at 19–20.  But the Stone et al. study rejected this argu-
ment and showed that since the start of the consent decree, motor vehicle and
pedestrian stops actually increased significantly. Id. at 22.  Further, comparisons
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However, a study by Lan Shi found that in the wake of the
Cincinnati Riots, arrests fell substantially, with the greatest
effect observed for crimes where police have considerable dis-
cretion.83  An investigation of the Seattle Police Department
similarly found that officers regularly engaged in less proactive
policing after the initiation of external federal regulation.84
And Paul G. Cassell and Richard Fowles have conducted one of
the most rigorous studies on the effect of police regulation on
officer behavior.85  They found that the introduction of external
regulations in the form of Miranda warnings contributed to a
statistically significant reduction in police clearance rates.86
C. Gaps in Existing Literature
Both of these versions of the de-policing hypothesis link
public scrutiny or external legal regulation to a reduction in
police aggressiveness.  And each hypothesis contends that this
reduction in aggressiveness will have measurable conse-
quences—namely, an increase in crime.  Presumably, these
theories implicitly assume that police behavior can influence
crime rates.  Thus, these hypotheses adopt a situational view of
criminology.87  This criminological view says that law enforce-
between similar surveys conducted in 1999 and 2003 found that the percentage
of officers who reported being afraid that an honest mistake would negatively
impact their careers actually decreased. Id. at 21.  Because of this, Stone et al.
concluded that most of the concern about de-policing was likely misplaced. Id. at
68.
83 Lan Shi, The Limit of Oversight in Policing: Evidence from the 2001 Cincin-
nati Riot, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 99, 111 (2009).
84 See Jonah Spangenthal-Lee, SPD Disputes Rumors of De-Policing Within the
Department, SEATTLE METROPOLITAN (Nov. 1, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://www.seat-
tlemet.com/articles/2011/11/1/spd-disputes-rumors-of-de-policing-within-the-
department [perma.cc/R5SL-SCR9].
85 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 11. R
86 Id. at 1118.
87 Historically, criminologists had explained the causes of crime in four ways.
Classical criminologists generally argue that individuals are rational actors; thus,
in order to deter crime policymakers ought to raise the costs of crime through
increasing the length or certainty of criminal penalties. See CESARE BECCARIA, ON
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Graeme R. Newman trans., Transaction Publishers 5th
ed. 2009) (1764); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 117–23, 142–44 (rev. ed.
1985).  Sociological criminologists contend that society defines and creates crime
through poverty, income inequality, and culture. See WILLIAM ADRIAN BONGER,
CRIMINALITY AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 402–05, 667–72 (Edward Lindsey ed., Henry
P. Horton trans., Agathon Press, Inc. 1967) (1916); Elliott Currie, Social Crime
Prevention in a Market Strategy, in CRIMINOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES: ESSENTIAL READ-
INGS 369, 369–82 (Eugene McLaughlin et al. eds., 2d ed. 2001); Emile Durkheim,
Rules for the Distinction of the Normal from the Pathological, in  THE RULES OF
SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD AND SELECTED TEXTS ON SOCIOLOGY AND ITS METHOD 85, 85–107
(Steven Lukes ed., W.D. Halls trans., 1982); PETER KROPOTKIN, Law and Authority,
in WORDS OF A REBEL 145, 159–64 (George Woodcock trans.1992); JOHN LEA & JOCK
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ment can deter crime through altering situational incentives of
would-be criminals.88  While scholars were skeptical about the
role of police officers in combatting crime in the mid-twentieth
century, emerging evidence suggests that police officers may
YOUNG, WHAT IS TO BE DONE ABOUT LAW AND ORDER? 81, 95–101, 218–25 (1984);
Adolphe Quetelet, Of the Development of the Propensity to Crime, in A TREATISE ON
MAN 82, 82–96, 103–8 (R. Knox trans., 1842).  Positivist criminologists believe
that biological differences may increase an individual’s propensity for criminal
behavior. See H.J. Eysenck, Personality Theory and the Problem of Criminality, in
APPLYING PSYCHOLOGY TO IMPRISONMENT 28, 30–31, 34–46 (Barry J. McGurk et al.
eds., 1987); CESARE LOMBROSO & WILLIAM FERRERO, THE FEMALE OFFENDER 103–13,
147–52, 190–91 (1895); Sarnoff A. Mednick et al., Genetic Factors in the Etiology
of Criminal Behavior, in THE CAUSES OF CRIME: NEW BIOLOGICAL APPROACHES 74,
74–91 (Sarnoff A. Mednick et al. eds., 1987).  And situational criminologists claim
that society can deter criminal deviance by adjusting situational incentives for
illegal behavior. See Marcus Felson, The Routine Activity Approach as a General
Crime Theory, in OF CRIME & CRIMINALITY 205, 205-216 (Sally S. Simpson ed.,
2000); George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1982, at 29; R.V.G. Clarke, “Situational”
Crime Prevention: Theory and Practice, 20 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 136, 139–40
(1980).  Other ancillary schools of criminology have explored topics such as the
need to rehabilitate and reintegrate criminal offenders, and the unequal impact of
the criminal justice system on minorities. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME
AND REINTEGRATION 69–83 (1989); FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRM-
ING REHABILITATION 247–63 (1982); Angela Y. Davis, Race and Criminalization:
Black Americans and the Punishment Industry, in THE HOUSE THAT RACE BUILT 264,
264–78 (Wahneema Lubiano ed., 1997).
88 Marcus Felson has argued that criminologists ought to view crime as
largely opportunistic—only possible in many cases because of the convergence of
a likely offender, a suitable target, and the absence of supervision.  Felson, supra
note 87, at 207–08.  When applying his so-called routine activity theory of crime R
prevention, Felson imagines a hypothetical situation where a burglar looks for an
opportunistic target:
A burglar tries to find a suitable household that is empty of guardi-
ans . . . .  The burglar seeks a place containing valuables easy to
remove.  Easy access and visibility draw the burglar further.  The
larger community structure offers the burglar crime opportunities
by producing more lightweight but valuable goods and getting peo-
ple out of their homes for work, school, or leisure.
Id. at 209.
Richard Clarke has similarly argued that the traditional criminological acad-
emy has failed to sufficiently explore situations determinant of crime.  Clarke,
supra note 87, at 136.  Clarke has recommended that criminologists focus on R
reducing physical opportunities for crime.  But early situational criminologists
like Clarke have been skeptical of the ability of police to alter situational opportu-
nities for crime—and for good reason.  Many of the earliest social scientists’ stud-
ies of police and crime control found that tactics like preventative patrols could
not successfully deter crime. See, e.g., GEORGE L. KELLING ET AL., THE KANSAS CITY
PREVENTIVE PATROL EXPERIMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT 1–4 (1974) (finding that changes
in the Kansas City preventive patrol methods did not substantially affect crime);
GEORGE L. KELLING ET AL., THE NEWARK FOOT PATROL EXPERIMENT 4–6 (1981) (finding
that changes in the use of preventative foot patrols in Newark, New Jersey had no
significant effect on crime rates).
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have some measurable effects on crime rates.89  If true, these
hypotheses have serious consequences for the study of policing
and criminal procedure.  They suggest that procedural efforts
to protect the Constitution come at a serious cost.
While a handful of studies have shed light on various ver-
sions of the de-policing hypothesis, there remain significant
gaps in the existing literature.  The existing studies generally
suffer from common methodological limitations.  First, some of
these studies have only looked at the effects of scrutiny or
intervention in individual police departments.90  While this
methodology may provide helpful insight into a specific case,
questions understandably remain about the generalizability of
any such findings.
Second, some of the existing de-policing studies rely on
time-series analysis, as opposed to panel data analysis.  Time-
series analysis uses successive measurements made over a
continuous time interval to see how the introduction of a condi-
tion affects an outcome variable in a given jurisdiction.91  In
some contexts, time-series analysis may be the best available
option because a change in law might have affected all munici-
palities across the country equally. However, “[t]he preferred
methodology for assessing a social policy” is an analysis which
involves “a true experiment in which one jurisdiction at ran-
dom is subjected to the new policy, while another ‘control’ ju-
risdiction is not.”92  Thus, the ideal study of the de-policing
89 See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime:
An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633, 634–35
(2014) (conducting a meta-analysis of existing studies and finding that hot spot
policing strategies produce small but noteworthy reductions in crime, while prob-
lem-oriented policing interventions create larger reductions); Steven D. Levitt,
Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effects of Police on Crime:
Reply, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1244, 1244 (2002) (using a number of proxies to show
that police have a negative impact on crime); Richard Rosenfeld et al., The Effects
of Directed Patrol and Self-Initiated Enforcement on Firearm Violence: A Random-
ized Controlled Study of Hot Spot Policing, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 428, 439–43 (2014)
(using a difference-in-difference regression analysis to conclude that hot spot
policing reduced the incidence of nondomestic firearm assaults).
90 See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra note 82, at 2–5 (studying the Los Angeles R
Police Department under a Justice Department intervention and a federal court
consent decree); Shi, supra note 83, at 78–79 (studying the impact of a Justice R
Department intervention in the Cincinnati Police Department after the 2001 Cin-
cinnati Riot).
91 For example, scholars like Paul G. Cassell and Richard Fowles have used
time-series analysis to investigate the effect of Miranda v. Arizona on police clear-
ance rates.  To do this, they examined trends in clearance rates before and after
1966—the year the Court handed down the controversial decision.  Cassell &
Fowles, supra note 11, at 1071–74. R
92 Id. at 1072.
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hypothesis, or any other “[p]rofessional econometric stud[y] on
the impact of legal rules” would ideally look at comparative
panel data, not aggregate, time-series data.93
These realizations lead to some obvious questions.  How
can researchers develop an experiment to test the de-policing
hypothesis that involves a sufficiently large number of police
departments to allow for some generalizability?  And what cir-
cumstances exist that would allow for comparative, panel data
analysis, rather than mere time-series analysis?  The next Part
suggests that a little known statute—42 U.S.C. § 14141—pro-
vides a unique opportunity to overcome both of these method-
ological challenges in testing the de-policing hypothesis.
II
METHODOLOGY
This Article uses a panel of American law enforcement
agencies and difference-in-difference regression analyses to
test the validity of the de-policing hypothesis.  In doing so, this
Article takes advantage of an original dataset of all American
police departments that have been subject to a unique form of
federal intervention via 42 U.S.C. § 14141.  As described in
more detail in Appendix F, we acquired this dataset through
Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests, stakeholder inter-
views, and an examination of court records.94  Congress passed
§ 14141 to provide the U.S. Attorney General with an equitable
remedy against law enforcement agencies engaged in systemic
misconduct.95  The subparts that follow argue that § 14141 is a
useful test of the de-policing hypothesis.  These subparts also
describe our model, variables, and controls.
A. Background on 42 U.S.C. § 14141
In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act (VCCLEA)—an omnibus measure that
touched on nearly every aspect of the American criminal justice
system.96  This law funded the hiring of 100,000 new police
officers, increased sanctions for criminal offenders, funded the
construction of new prisons, banned assault weapons, and
93 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
278, 291 (1996).
94 See infra Appendix F.
95 See Rushin, supra note 18, at 1346–47. R
96 Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 210401, 108 Stat. 2071 (1994).
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passed the Violence Against Women Act.97  But hidden inside
this major reform package was a little known statute that
transformed the role of the federal government in local policing.
42 U.S.C. § 14141 provides the U.S. Attorney General with the
authority to seek equitable relief against American police de-
partments engaged in a “pattern or practice” of unconstitu-
tional wrongdoing.98  Before the passage of § 14141, neither
the DOJ nor private litigants had the standing to pursue equi-
table relief against American police departments.99
In Los Angeles v. Lyons, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
a private litigant did not have standing to bring suit against the
Los Angeles Police Department, even though he was victimized
by an unjustified chokehold.100  The Court concluded that a
person can only have standing to enjoin police behavior when
they can show “a real and immediate threat that he would
again be stopped . . . by an officer or officers who would illegally
choke him into unconsciousness without any provocation.”101
97 Perhaps the best description of the VCCLEA’s passage comes from a book
published by Lord Windlesham. LORD WINDLESHAM, POLITICS, PUNISHMENT, AND POP-
ULISM 119–23 (1998) (discussing the political climate leading up to the VCCLEA’s
passage).  In total, the Act cost taxpayers around $30 billion. Id. at 122.  The
measure provided funding for the hiring of 100,000 more police officers.  It also
provided $9.9 billion for the building of new prisons. SHAHID M. SHAHIDULLAH,
CRIME POLICY IN AMERICA: LAWS, INSTITUTIONS, AND PROGRAMS 23 (2d ed. 2016).  The
VCCLEA mandated so-called strict truth-in-sentencing requirements, imple-
mented life sentences for repeat violent offenders, banned nineteen types of as-
sault weapons, banned juvenile ownership of handguns, added additional
penalties for hate crimes, and extended the death penalty. See id.  Additionally,
the Act allocated another “$2.6 billion . . . for the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Drug Enforcement Agency, Immigration and Naturalization Services, United
States Attorneys, and other Justice Department components.” ERICA R. MEINERS,
RIGHT TO BE HOSTILE: SCHOOLS, PRISONS, AND THE MAKING OF PUBLIC ENEMIES 103
(2007).
98 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any governmental au-
thority . . . to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement
officers . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution . . . .” and “Whenever the Attorney General has
reasonable cause to believe [that there is a pattern or practice of misconduct] . . .
the Attorney General . . . may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and
declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice”).
99 For a detailed summary of these cases, see Rushin, supra note 25, at R
3204–07 (describing the details in Lyons and City of Philadelphia, the two major
cases that limited equitable and injunctive standing in cases of police brutality).
100 461 U.S. 95, 97–100, 111 (1983).  In 1976, LAPD officers stopped Adolph
Lyons for a typical traffic violation.  While Lyons did not resist, the officers none-
theless seized Lyons in a chokehold without any apparent provocation.  Lyons
brought suit against the LAPD, asking in part for the court to enjoin the LAPD
from using such chokeholds in the future.  The court stated that, “Absent a
sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way, Lyons is no
more entitled to an injunction than any other citizen of Los Angeles.” Id. at 111.
101 Id. at 105.
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Since virtually no private party can show such a continuing
threat, the Lyons decision meant that few private parties could
ever successfully obtain equitable relief against a police depart-
ment.  Similarly, in City of Philadelphia v. United States, the
DOJ attempted to enjoin unconstitutional behavior on the part
of the Philadelphia Police Department.102  The Third Circuit
held that absent congressional authorization, the DOJ also
lacked standing to seek such injunctive relief.103
After Lyons and City of Philadelphia, it appeared that
neither the DOJ nor private parties generally had the authority
to seek equitable relief against American police departments.
So in 1991, in direct response to the Rodney King video,104
102 644 F.2d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 1980).  This case happened when the DOJ filed
a lawsuit against the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD), alleging a pattern of
police abuse that systemically violated residents’ constitutional rights. Id. (ex-
plaining at the appellate level that “[t]he government’s theory is that the appellees,
the City of Philadelphia and numerous high-ranking officials of the City and its
Police Department, have engaged in a pattern or practice of depriving persons of
rights protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment”).  The
DOJ alleged that the PPD maintained policies and procedures that thwarted the
investigation and the disciplining of police officers who engaged in unconstitu-
tional behavior.  The DOJ asked for an injunction to prohibit the PPD from engag-
ing in this sort of unconstitutional misconduct. See id.  The DOJ had previously
prosecuted six PPD homicide detectives for coercing confessions out of possibly
innocent suspects. See BONNIE MATHEWS & GLORIA IZUMI, U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, WHO IS GUARDING THE GUARDIANS?: A REPORT ON POLICE PRACTICES 135–36
(1981), http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/007105152 [https://perma.cc/
9TAM-CY6Y].  But rather than punishing these officers, the City actually pro-
moted and supported these officers. See id.
103 See City of Phila., 644 F.2d at 206 (“[W]e will hold the Attorney General to
the same pleading requirements we demand of a private litigant who brings an
action under the Civil Rights Acts.  The appellant failed to satisfy these standards,
and it deliberately rejected an opportunity to amend its complaint.”).
104 See Rushin, supra note 25, at 3209 (explaining the role of the Rodney King R
video in spurring the passage of § 14141).  The Rodney King beating was caught
on video by George Holliday. See Tape of Police Beating Causes Furor, SEATTLE
TIMES, Mar. 6, 1991, at A2 (“The video, shot by amateur photographer George
Holliday, shows no indication that King tried to hit or charge the officers.”).  The
video showed Rodney King being kicked and struck with a baton by several
officers near a Southern California highway. See Seth Mydans, Videotaped Beat-
ing by Officers Puts Full Glare on Brutality Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, at A1.
Within days of the video going public, it sparked national outrage and calls for the
resignation of then-LAPD Chief Daryl Gates. See Editorial, An ‘Aberration’ or
Police Business as Usual?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1991, at E7 (“More than 1,000
callers from around the country phoned Mr. Gates’s office expressing their out-
rage and demanding that he resign.”).  Observers, including President George H.
W. Bush, condemned the behavior of the officers in the video. See INDEP. COMM’N
ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGE-
LES POLICE DEPARTMENT 3 (1991).  The Rodney King beating happened on March 3,
1991.  On March 20, 1991, the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary called a hearing to discuss the issue of
police brutality. Police Brutality: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Con-
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Congress considered legislation to provide the federal govern-
ment with a larger role in local police affairs.105  This legisla-
tion, known as the Police Accountability Act of 1991, failed to
garner widespread support.106  But by 1994, Congress incorpo-
rated a version of the Police Accountability Act into the omni-
bus VCCLEA.107
B. The § 14141 Reform Process
When Congress eventually passed § 14141, scholars hailed
it as one of the most important federal regulations of policing in
American history.108  However, the DOJ has only had the re-
sources to pursue § 14141 actions against a small subsection
of American police departments.109  For much of the statute’s
stitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. (1991) [hereinafter
Police Brutality Hearing].
105 At the hearings post-Rodney King, the Police Accountability Act of 1991
emerged.  Police Accountability Act of 1991, H.R. Res. 2972, 102nd Cong (1991).
The measure was sponsored by Representatives William Edwards, Howard
Berman, John Conyers, Julian Dixon, Mervyn Dymally, Michael Kopetski, Meldon
Levine, Craig Washington, and Maxine Waters.  Four of those individuals—Ed-
wards, Conyers, Washington, and Kopetski—served on the Subcommittee that
heard the initial recommendation that Congress pass a measure to permit private
and/or public litigants file for equitable relief against police departments. See
Police Brutality Hearing, supra note 104, at 1. R
106 See Federal Response to Police Misconduct: Hearing Before the H. Sub-
comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd
Cong. 2 (1992) (statement of Rep. William Edwards, Member, H. Comm. on the
Judiciary) (reporting Representative Edwards’s statement that, after the subcom-
mittee unanimously approved the structural police reform measure and incorpo-
rated the measure into the Omnibus Crime Bill of 1991, “there’s been a filibuster
ever since on the whole crime bill”).
107 Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 210401, 108 Stat. 2071 (1994).
108 See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Miscon-
duct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 457, 464–65 (2004) (calling § 14141 “perhaps
the most promising legal mechanism” for reducing police misconduct); William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 538–39
n.134 (2001) (stating that § 14141 may be “more significant, in the long run, than
Mapp v. Ohio, which mandated the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.” (citation omitted)).
109 See Rushin, supra note 25, at 3226 (showing in Figure 2 that between R
2000 and 2013 the DOJ only investigated thirty-eight agencies and only settled
with around nineteen agencies).  This is in part because “investigations are a
costly endeavor.” Id.  They “can take years as investigators wade through piles of
internal records and personnel files.”  Jamie Stockwell, Rights Investigation of
Police Continues, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2002, at C6.  Thus, even if that systemic
misconduct is present in only a small percentage of the nation’s approximately
17,985 police agencies, the DOJ has only initiated § 14141 investigations against
a tiny fraction of these problematic agencies. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 2 (2011),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf [https://perma.cc/VUJ8-
NXG7] (putting the number of state and local law enforcement agencies at
17,985).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-3\CRN301.txt unknown Seq: 25 28-MAR-17 10:05
2017] DE-POLICING 745
history, the DOJ’s enforcement of § 14141 was somewhat se-
cret.  That changed in 2014 when a scholar conducted inter-
views with stakeholders involved in § 14141 cases.110  This
research revealed that the DOJ engages in a six-part enforce-
ment approach.111
FIGURE 1.  STAGES § 14141 ENFORCEMENT.
Stage 1. Case Selection 
Stage 2. Preliminary Inquiry 
Stage 3. Formal Investigation 
Stage 4. Settlement Negotiations
Stage 5. Appointment of Monitor
Stage 6. Monitored Reform 
To start, the DOJ must identify which American police de-
partments are engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitu-
tional misconduct in violation of the statute.112  This is a
challenging feat, given that there are 18,000 police depart-
ments in the United States.113  To do this, DOJ litigators use a
diverse array of proxies to identify police departments that may
be engaged in problematic practices.114  The DOJ refers to the
scrutiny applied to police departments after this initial case
selection as the preliminary inquiry.115  While this stage in-
volves some scrutiny of law enforcement agencies, the DOJ has
a strict policy of not publicly releasing the identity of police
departments subject to preliminary inquiries.116  If the DOJ
finds evidence of potentially suspect behavior during the pre-
110 See generally Rushin, supra note 25, at 3218–28 (describing the enforce- R
ment process for § 14141 litigation); Rushin, supra note 18, at 1366–96 (describ- R
ing the rest of the § 14141 reform process).
111 Rushin, supra note 18, at 1367 (showing these stages in Figure 1, recre- R
ated in this article also as Figure 1).
112 See id. “The first step in the [structural reform litigation] process is case
selection.  In this stage, the DOJ has the responsibility of identifying police agen-
cies that may be engaged in a pattern or practice of misconduct.”).
113 See REAVES, supra note 109, at 2 tbl.1 (putting the number of police depart- R
ments at just under 18,000).
114 See Rushin, supra note 25, at 3219–24 (identifying five major proxies that R
the DOJ uses to identify potentially problematic police departments: (1) existing
civil litigation, (2) media reports, (3) research studies, (4) whistleblowers, and (5)
single, egregious examples of wrongdoing).
115 See id. at 3224 (“The second step of the structural police reform process is
the preliminary inquiry.  If a police agency comes to the attention of the DOJ
through one of the manners listed above, the agency will open a preliminary
inquiry into that department’s conduct.”).
116 To further elaborate on this stage of § 14141 cases:
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liminary inquiry stage, litigators will next conduct a formal
investigation.117  At this point, the DOJ’s interest in a police
department becomes public knowledge.118  Investigations can
last anywhere from a few months to a year or more in length.119
During this time, the DOJ puts these targeted police depart-
ments under intense public scrutiny.120
If the formal investigation results in a finding that a police
department is in violation of § 14141,121 the DOJ next attempts
to intervene in the troubled agency.  In most cases, this reform
process starts with the DOJ attempting to negotiate an amica-
ble set of reforms.122  Virtually all § 14141 cases have ended in
settlements.123  These settlements look fairly similar from one
During this initial phase, litigators at the DOJ, both past and pre-
sent, are careful to describe their actions as inquiries, as opposed to
investigations.  This distinction matters, they say, because of the
serious implications of a formal investigation.  Participants consist-
ently explained that by identifying a department as “under investi-
gation,” the DOJ would expose that department to immediate
criticism in the media.  Moreover, such a decision also triggers a
long and expensive investigation.  Thus, the DOJ prefers to only
advance a case to the investigatory realm if the litigator finds reason
to believe the agency is involved in systemic misconduct, and the
leadership at the Department believes that such an investigation
would be a worthwhile use of limited resources.
Id. at 3225 (citations omitted).
117 See id. at 3226 (“If this initial inquiry uncovers the possibility of persistent
misconduct in a police department, the DOJ may conduct a formal
investigation.”).
118 See id.
119 See id.; see also David Hench, City Police to Get Federal Review, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD, May 8, 2002, at 1A (stating that investigations can last as long as a
year in some cases).
120 See supra note 23 and accompanying text (describing the Chicago Police R
Department as an example where the DOJ began an investigation soon after the
Laquan McDonald shooting).
121 Thus far, the DOJ has found the following constitutional violations in the
following number of police agencies: Excessive Force (48 agencies), Discrimina-
tory Policing (38 agencies), Unlawful Stops, Searches, or Seizures (29 agencies),
Unlawful Arrests (5 agencies), Poor Jail Conditions (4 agencies), Gender Bias in
Handling Sexual Assault Reports (2 agencies), Improper Detentions (2 agencies),
Sexual Misconduct (1 agency), Retaliation (1 agency), and Improper Treatment of
the Mentally Ill (1 agency).  PBS FRONTLINE, supra note 25. R
122 For a detailed description of this settlement negotiation process, see
Rushin, supra note 18, at 1372–78.  This settlement negotiation is often a real R
negotiation, where both sides make separate demands before meeting somewhere
in the middle.  However, while “these settlement agreements do appear to emerge
via true negotiation between various stakeholders, the DOJ typically holds an
advantageous bargaining position.” Id. at 1375.
123 See id. at 1418 (describing the recent Alamance County case as the “first
time a municipality brings a § 14141 case to trial” rather than settling with the
DOJ).  In that case, the DOJ believed that Sheriff Terry Johnson’s department was
engaged in a pattern of racially charged policing tactics.  A full-scale investigation
by the DOJ led to a lawsuit alleging that Sheriff Johnson was in violation of
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agency to the next.124  Common requirements include officer
use of force provisions,125 the implementation of an early inter-
ventions system,126 complaint management reforms,127 train-
§ 14141, but the claim was later dismissed by a U.S. district judge. See Michael
D. Abernethy, Judge Dismisses DOJ Case Against Johnson, Finds No Evidence of
Unconstitutional Practices, TIMES-NEWS (Aug. 7, 2015, 6:55 PM), http://www.the-
timesnews.com/article/20150807/NEWS/150809283 [https://perma.cc/XD9K-
4P6N]; Colin Campbell, McCrory Honors Alamance County Sheriff Facing Federal
Allegations of Racial Profiling, NEWS & OBSERVER (Dec. 19, 2014, 2:08 PM), http://
www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/politics-columns-blogs/
under-the-dome/article10198235.html [https://perma.cc/UF8Q-XTHF]; David
Zucchino, Sheriff’s Treatment of Latinos Splits Town: A North Carolina Lawman
Practices Discriminatory Policing, the Justice Department Says, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24,
2012, at A13; Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Urges Alamance Sheriff to Comply with
DOJ Requests in Light of Lawsuit (Dec. 20, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/news/
aclu-urges-alamance-sheriff-comply-doj-requests-light-lawsuit?redirect=criminal
-law-reform-immigrants-rights/aclu-urges-alamance-sheriff-comply-doj-re
quests-light-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/7JQZ-SZJ2].
124 See Rushin, supra note 18, at 1378 (“While each negotiated settlement R
should be specifically tailored to the unique needs of the individual municipality,
the settlements have proven to be remarkably similar over time.”).
125 See, e.g., Seattle Agreement, supra note 18, at 16–40 (detailing regulations R
on use of firearms, conductive energy devices, oleoresin capsicum spray, and
impact weapons); Consent Decree, United States v. The Territory of the Virgin
Islands, No. 3:08-cv-00158-CVG-RM, at 6, ¶ 32 (D.V.I. Mar. 24, 2009), http://
www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-VI-0001-0003.pdf [https://perma
.cc/VC44-B4CL] [hereinafter Virgin Islands Consent Decree] (requiring documen-
tation of all uses of force); Consent Decree, United States v. Prince George’s
County, Md., No. 8:04-cv-00185-RWT, at 15–17, ¶¶ 47–52 (D. Md. Jan. 22, 2004),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-MD-0001-0003.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PE9X-LTLC] (explaining reporting requirements for use of canines);
Consent Decree, United States v. City of L.A., No. 2:00-cv-11769-GAF-RC, at
23–27, ¶¶ 55–69 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2001), http://www.clearinghouse.net/
chDocs/public/PN-CA-0002-0006.pdf [https://perma.cc/JT9K-6GVA] [hereinaf-
ter Los Angeles Consent Decree] (establishing a clear chain of review every time an
officer uses force); Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Depart-
ment of Justice and Prince George’s County, Maryland and the Prince George’s
County Police Department, at 7–8, ¶¶ 35–39 (Jan. 22, 2004), http://www
.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-MD-0001-0002.pdf [https://perma.cc/
68YH-SDK5] [hereinafter Prince George’s County MOA] (specifically regulating
only the use of force involving oleoresin capsicum spray).
126 See, e.g., New Jersey Consent Decree, supra note 18, at 15–18, ¶¶ 40–56 R
(describing the development of the management awareness program); Pittsburgh
Consent Decree, supra note 18, at 6–7, ¶¶ 12, 16–17, 23 (stating that the city R
should implement the early information system within twelve months and
describing the annual review process for this system).
127 See, e.g., Los Angeles Consent Decree, supra note 125, at 29–35, ¶¶ 74–87 R
(detailing rules on the initiation, investigation, and adjudication of complaints);
Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Dep’t of Justice and the
District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment, ¶¶ 92–104 (June 13, 2001), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/pub-
lic/PN-DC-0001-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6D5-X8K2] (including sections on
the receipt of citizen complaints, the investigation of complaints, and the evalua-
tion of these allegations).
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ing overhauls,128 stipulations dealing with bias-free
policing,129 community oriented policing, and a range of other
topics including line-up procedures,130 gang unit manage-
ment,131 canine deployment,132 crisis intervention,133 and even
promotion evaluations.134
Once an agreement is in place, the reform process can
begin.  This reform process has taken as little as five years in
some places.135 In other locations it has taken well over a dec-
128 See, e.g., Virgin Islands Consent Decree, supra note 125, at 18, ¶ 77 (“The R
VIPD shall continue to maintain training records regarding every VIPD officer that
reliably indicate the training each officer has received.  The training records shall,
at a minimum, include the course description and duration, curriculum, and
instructor for each officer.”); New Jersey Consent Decree, supra note 18, at ¶¶
108–09 (“[T]he State Police will track all training information, including name of
the course, date started, date completed, and training location for each member
receiving training.”); Consent Decree, United States v. City of Steubenville, No. 97-
7966, at 6–7, ¶ 14 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 1997), http://www.clearinghouse.net/
chDocs/public/PN-OH-0002-0005.pdf [https://perma.cc/FEY9-7KK2] [hereinaf-
ter Steubenville Consent Decree] (identifying the need for entry and annual in-
service training).
129 See, e.g., Consent Decree Regarding the New Orleans Police Department,
United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 2:12-cv-01924-SM-JCW, at ¶¶ 177–222
(E.D. La. July 24, 2012), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-LA-
0001-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/24Q7-ZSKN] [hereinafter New Orleans Con-
sent Decree] (laying out terms, in great detail, for how the New Orleans Police
Department could avoid racially-biased and gender-biased policing tactics); Pitts-
burgh Consent Decree, supra note 18, at 13–14, ¶ 20 (requiring regular audits R
and reviews of potential racial bias by officers); Steubenville Consent Decree,
supra note 128, at 31, ¶ 77 (“The City shall conduct regular audits and reviews of R
potential racial bias (including use of racial epithets) by all officers.”).
130 See, e.g., New Orleans Consent Decree, supra note 129, ¶¶ 171–76 (estab- R
lishing procedures for photographic lineup administrations).
131 See, e.g., Los Angeles Consent Decree, supra note 125, ¶¶ 106–07 (requir- R
ing the development and administration of gang management policy).
132 Prince George’s County MOA, supra note 125, at 8–11, ¶¶ 40–48 (estab- R
lishing thorough regulation of canine deployment).
133 Seattle Agreement, supra note 18, at 37–39, ¶¶ 130–37 (laying out regula- R
tions on crisis intervention via the creation of the crisis intervention committee).
134 New Orleans Consent Decree, supra note 129, ¶¶ 295–305 (establishing R
both performance evaluations and promotions and describing how these evalua-
tions ought to be used in the promotion process).
135 A complete list of the opening and closing dates for these cases can be
found in Appendices A and B.  For example, the Cincinnati monitoring lasted from
April 12, 2002, to April 12, 2007—approximately 1,826 days or 5.0 years. See
infra Appendix B.  One of the monitoring periods for Prince George’s County lasted
from January 22, 2004, to January 13, 2009—approximately 1,818 days or 5.0
years. See infra Appendix B.  The Steubenville monitoring lasted from September
3, 1997, to March 3, 2005—approximately 2,738 days or 7.5 years. See infra
Appendix B.  The Pittsburgh monitoring lasted from April 16, 1997, to June 16,
2005—approximately 2983 days or 8.2 years. See infra Appendix B.  The New
Jersey monitoring lasted from December 29, 1999, to October 26, 2009—approxi-
mately 3,589 days or 9.8 years. See infra Appendix B.
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ade to complete.136  During this time, a municipality is re-
quired to make significant substantive and procedural changes
aimed at deterring misconduct, often overseen by a team of
external monitors to ensure regular compliance with the terms
of the agreement.137  Figure 2 illustrates the widespread use of
§ 14141 across the United States over the last twenty-one
years.
FIGURE 2.  POLICE DEPARTMENTS TARGETED FOR FEDERAL
INTERVENTION.138
C. DOJ Enforcement of § 14141 as a Case Study for the
De-Policing Hypothesis
Section 14141 presents a unique opportunity to test the
de-policing hypothesis.  First, a test of the de-policing hypothe-
sis based on § 14141 cases allows for cross-jurisdictional anal-
ysis.  For much of American history, external regulation of
American police departments happened through procedural
rulings handed down by state and federal courts.  For example,
136 See infra Appendices A & B. The Washington, D.C. monitoring lasted from
June 13, 2001, to February 10, 2012—approximately 3,884 days or 10.7 years.
See infra Appendix B.  And the Los Angeles monitoring lasted from June 15, 2001,
to May 16, 2013—approximately 4353 days or 11.9 years. See infra Appendix B.
137 For a detailed description of how the DOJ and targeted municipalities
agree on the appointment of an external monitor and the costs associated with
these appointments, see Rushin, supra note 18, at 1388–91. R
138 Data for Figure 2 drawn from Appendices A and B.
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when the U.S. Supreme Court handed down the Miranda deci-
sion, it required all American police departments to read sus-
pects a set of prophylactic rights before engaging in custodial
interrogation.139  As a result, researchers who studied the im-
pact of Miranda had to examine the changes in crime rates or
clearance rates before and after the Court’s decision.140  While
useful, this methodology has its limitations.  When the Court
handed down the Miranda decision, it equally burdened all
police departments in the United States.141  This meant that
there was no way to complete cross-jurisdictional analysis.
That is, there was no way to compare jurisdictions affected by
Miranda with jurisdictions not affected by Miranda over the
same time period.  All jurisdictions were equally burdened.
This makes it difficult to distinguish between changes in crime
rates or clearance rates caused by Miranda and changes
caused by other factors that happened to occur at the same
time as Miranda.
Regulation via § 14141 is different.  Since 1994, the DOJ
has investigated sixty-one agencies and reached settlements
with thirty-one agencies.142  This includes police departments
in large American cities like New York, Los Angeles, Chicago,
Washington, D.C., Seattle, Albuquerque, Cincinnati, New Orle-
ans, Newark, and Cleveland, and smaller communities like Fer-
guson, Missouri, Steubenville, Ohio, and Villa Rica, Georgia.143
Despite this wide variation in communities targeted for DOJ
intervention, § 14141 cases still represent a small percentage
of the country’s 18,000 law enforcement agencies; the vast ma-
jority of American police departments have never come under
DOJ suspicion.144  This provides us with a chance to observe
crime rates from a “treatment” group of agencies—those that
have been subject to significant public scrutiny or mandatory
139 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. R
140 See, e.g., Cassell & Fowles, supra note 11, at 1087 (using a time-series R
analysis to show that Miranda had a statistically significant role in reducing
clearance rates).
141 This is because Miranda, Mapp, and other major criminal procedure cases
were found to apply to all state and national law enforcement officers.  This meant
that the rules applied to every single police officer in the country.
142 See infra Appendices A & B.
143 For a complete list, see infra Appendices A & B.
144 In fact, 99.7% of American law enforcement agencies have not been subject
to DOJ intervention or investigation via § 14141—or roughly 17,924 of the na-
tion’s approximately 17,985 agencies. See REAVES, supra note 109, at 2 (estimat- R
ing that there are approximately 17,985 state and local law enforcement agencies
in the United States); infra Appendix A (showing that approximately sixty-one
police departments have been subject to either an investigation or full-scale DOJ
intervention under § 14141).
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external regulation via § 14141—and compare them with a
“control” group of agencies who have not been subject to simi-
lar conditions.
Second, when the DOJ reaches a § 14141 settlement, it
typically requires police departments to make significant re-
forms.145  This stands in stark contrast to most external regu-
lations of American law enforcement agencies, which often
happen via binding court opinions handed down by courts.
When a court hands down an important police procedural case,
the case typically binds police behavior in a relatively narrow
circumstance.  For instance, in Arizona v. Gant, the U.S. Su-
preme Court limited the ability of police officers to execute
searches of automobiles incident to arrests without a war-
rant.146  Some critics may have viewed Gant as unnecessary or
unjustified regulations of police discretion.  But it seems un-
likely that Gant, in and of itself, would lead to substantial de-
policing that would ultimately cause a measurable change in
crime rates.147  Even if controversial, reforms taken by police
departments after Gant were likely insufficiently invasive to
result in widespread de-policing.  There is also real debate
about whether police departments even make the substantive
and procedural reforms demanded by court cases—or whether
police departments find ways to navigate around these new
hurdles.148
Again, DOJ action via § 14141 different.  For one thing,
DOJ intervention seems to bring about real, procedural and
substantive changes to affected police departments.149  This is
145 See supra notes 125–134 and accompanying text. R
146 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009)
147 It is, of course, possible that this decision could result in officers executing
fewer automobile searches incident to arrest.  But given that this decision only
affects one narrow type of police behavior, it seems less apparent that changes to
police behavior in very specific situations would eventually result in higher crime
rates.
148 See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991) (arguing that
Supreme Court mandates often do not have the intended effect of stimulating
social change, including the Court’s Miranda decision).
149 The LAPD is a particularly good example of a police department that ap-
peared to have made substantial progress during federal intervention.  For exam-
ple, Stone et al. found that federal intervention was associated with an
improvement in public opinion of law enforcement in the city. STONE ET AL. supra
note 81, at 44 fig.29, 50 fig.33 (showing that the proportion of residents who R
believed that the LAPD offered “good” or “excellent” services increased from
around 48% in 2005 to around 61% in 2009, and that the percentage of individu-
als who said that the LAPD treated all racial groups fairly went up from 39% in
2005 to around 51% in 2009).  Categorical uses of force—defined as the use of
serious force like use of a firearm, head strikes, dog bites, other injuries that
require hospitalization—fell during federal intervention. See Rushin, supra note
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because so many § 14141 cases involve external monitors who
ensure organizational compliance with DOJ demands.150  Ad-
ditionally, the DOJ typically requires police departments
targeted under § 14141 to implement a substantial package of
reforms.151  Thus, if external regulation is associated with de-
policing, § 14141 cases should be a useful test case for this
hypothesis, as they represent the most invasive form of exter-
nal regulation permitted under modern American law.
This Article takes advantage of the unique § 14141 en-
forcement reform process to test both versions of the de-polic-
ing hypothesis identified in Part I, as discussed in the next two
subparts.152
1. Investigations as Proxies for Scrutiny
In testing the de-policing effects of external scrutiny, this
study uses public investigations as a proxy for the presence of
public scrutiny.  To do this, we draw on a dataset of all sixty-
one public investigations that the DOJ has conducted since the
passage of § 14141 in 1994.153  Admittedly, this is a somewhat
different way to test for the presence of public scrutiny.154  But
we believe that this represents a defensible and robust way to
examine the theoretical underpinnings of the Ferguson Effect.
18, at 1361–62.  These were just a couple of the numerous measures that showed R
that the LAPD made remarkable progress during federal intervention. See id. at
1361–63.
150 See Rushin, supra note 18, at 1401 (describing the value of external moni- R
toring in bringing about sustainable reform in American police departments).
151 See supra notes 125–134 and accompanying text. R
152 We regrettably do not have sufficient data to determine the effect of exter-
nal regulation and scrutiny on police aggressiveness.  While the federal govern-
ment does collect some data on arrests executed by local law enforcement in
major crime categories, the United States does not collect detailed data on minor
arrests, traffic stops, Terry stops, and other sorts of less serious law enforcement
behavior.  Without these metrics, it is nearly impossible to draw any definitive
conclusions about changes in police aggressiveness.
153 For information on how we collected this data, see infra Appendix F.
154 Arguably, this Article’s definition of scrutiny may not perfectly capture the
idea of scrutiny imagined by some proponents of the Ferguson Effect hypothesis.
Some have used the term Ferguson Effect to describe the growing challenges
faced by police officers in the era of YouTube and smartphones, not the type of
more organized scrutiny a police department suffers after the announcement of a
federal civil rights investigation.  While this is a fair criticism, we believe that the
initiation of public § 14141 investigations represents the most robust proxy for
scrutiny that we could readily identify across multiple police departments in the
United States.  There does not exist, to our knowledge, a naturally occurring
situation that would allow us to use panel data analysis to test the effect of
increased cell phone camera, YouTube, or other social media use on police behav-
ior and crime rates.
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Previous empirical studies on the link between public scru-
tiny and de-policing have used somewhat imprecise proxies for
public scrutiny.  For example, multiple studies used the
Michael Brown shooting to test this hypothesis.155  These stud-
ies presumed that the Michael Brown shooting served as a
flashpoint, increasing public distrust of law enforcement and
the likelihood of negative interactions with the public.156  While
the Michael Brown shooting likely resulted in a shift in public
opinion about law enforcement within Ferguson, Missouri, who
is to say that it contributed to a similar change in other juris-
dictions across the country?  In order to accurately test the
theoretical underpinnings of the Ferguson Effect hypothesis,
we need to find a way to test the effect of a destabilizing policing
event—like the Michael Brown shooting—on the local commu-
nity where that event happened.  To ensure some level of gener-
alizability, we need to ensure that these destabilizing events are
roughly the same from one municipality to the next.  And we
need to test this hypothesis across many different municipali-
ties facing similar situations.
Federal investigations pursuant to § 14141 present a use-
ful opportunity to accomplish all of these goals.  Like the
Michael Brown shooting, public § 14141 investigations are de-
stabilizing incidents within targeted communities that expose
the affected police departments to added public distrust and
negative interactions.157  In fact, § 14141 investigations com-
monly happen soon after a publicly embarrassing incident of
alleged misconduct similar to the Michael Brown shooting in
Ferguson.158  And the process by which the DOJ initiates a
public § 14141 investigation has remained roughly consistent
155 See, e.g., ROSENFELD, supra note 68, at 3–4 (analyzing crimes rates in St. R
Louis and arguing that “double-digit homicide increases in St. Louis and other
cities during the past several months should not be discounted as unimportant”);
Pyrooz et al., supra note 71, at 7 (analyzing nationwide crime rates and determin- R
ing that “there is no nationwide Ferguson Effect on crime rates”).
156 See, e.g., Pyrooz et al., supra note 71, at 2 (arguing that “high-profile R
incidents such as Ferguson may convey to the public that justice is being admin-
istered unfairly and lead to challenges to the legitimacy of the law,” and that “[o]ne
response to the belief that the law is not administered fairly is increased participa-
tion in crime”).
157 See supra note 23 and accompanying text (describing the Chicago Police R
Department as an example where the DOJ began an investigation soon after the
Laquan McDonald shooting).
158 Thus, our study does not just examine whether the Michael Brown incident
led to de-policing.  Instead, it examines whether de-policing happened after the
Michael Brown shooting in Ferguson, the Timothy Thomas shooting in Cincinnati,
the Laquan MacDonald shooting in Chicago, the Rampart scandal in Los Angeles,
or dozens of other highly visible incidents of alleged misconduct that sparked DOJ
investigations in their respective jurisdictions.
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from one community to the next.159  Thus, we believe that pub-
lic § 14141 investigations provide a unique opportunity to test
the theoretical underpinning of the Ferguson Effect across a
number of police departments.
2. Settlements as Proxies for Regulation
This study uses the presence of a binding DOJ settlement
or consent decree pursuant to § 14141 as a proxy for the pres-
ence of external regulation.  This allows us to test whether the
introduction of external regulation is associated with any mea-
surable changes in crime rates, as some critics suggest.  We
found that the DOJ has reached thirty-one binding settlements
or consent decrees with local and state police departments
since 1994.160
D. Models, Variables, and Control
We use a difference-in-differences estimation strategy to
assess the influence of federal intervention via § 14141 on
crime rates.  Difference-in-differences estimation “consists of
identifying a specific intervention or treatment (often the pas-
sage of a law)” and then “compar[ing] the difference[s] in out-
comes after and before the intervention for groups affected by
the intervention to the same difference for unaffected
groups.”161  It uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions
across repeated cross sections (or a panel) of data on treatment
and control groups “for several years before and after a specific
intervention.”162  The goal is to identify whether a treatment
group affected by a legal intervention differs over time from a
control group unaffected by that legal intervention, when con-
trolling for other potentially explanatory variables.
In this Article, to estimate the average treatment effect that
DOJ investigations and regulations via § 14141 have on crime,
159 See supra notes 112–121 and accompanying text. R
160 A full list of these agencies is available in Appendix B.  Eighteen of these
agencies have fully implemented the terms of these DOJ agreements, while thir-
teen remain ongoing.  See infra Appendix B.
161 See Marianne Bertrand et al., How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-
Differences Estimates?, 119 Q. J. ECON. 249, 249 (2004).  This methodology is
commonly used to judge the effects of a legal intervention.  It is best used when
interventions are “as good as random, conditional on time and group fixed ef-
fects.” Id. at 250.  As a result, some concerns emerge about the “endogeneity of
the interventions themselves.” Id.
162 Id. at 250 (“[Difference-in-differences] estimates and their standard errors
most often derive from using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in repeated cross
sections (or a panel) of data on individuals in treatment and control groups for
several years before and after a specific intervention.”).
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we estimate the following model on a panel dataset where the
unit of observation is measured at the agency by year level:
MODEL 1.
This formula represents a log-linear model where the de-
pendent variable, ln(sit), is the natural log of various measures
of reported crime rates per 100,000 residents, measured at
time t, in agency i, and the standard errors are clustered at the
agency level.163 Y is a matrix of controls outlined below, g is a
set of year fixed effects, and t is a set of agency fixed effects.164
With the inclusion of agency and year fixed effects, what results
is a difference-in-differences modeling approach to
estimation.165
We believe that this model represents the simplest codifica-
tion of the DOJ investigations and external regulations, and
measures the average effect across all treated years.166  How-
ever, there may be reason to believe that the effect of DOJ
intervention on crime may vary dynamically as the treated
years pass.  For example, it is possible that DOJ intervention
163 Clustering the standard errors at the agency level helps adjust for the
autocorrelation in the unobserved variation in the outcome variable as well as
adjust the standard error estimates for the potential of heteroskedastic standard
errors. See id., at 265.
164 In this context, a “fixed effect” refers to a set of dummy variables—variables
that only take the value zero or one—for each category in the group.  For instance,
a fixed effect for the year 1989 would be zero for all agency by year observations in
the data set except for the year of 1989 at which point the dummy variable takes
on the value of one.  The inclusion of agency fixed effects provides for a within-
agency estimator.  That is, any measured change estimated comes off of a differ-
ence observed within an agency over time.  Because of this, agency fixed effects
parse out any time-invariant unobserved factor that may be driving crime rates.
165 For more on the application of difference-in-differences estimators, see
generally John J. Donohue, Guns, Crime, and the Impact of State Right-to-Carry
Laws, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 623 (2004); Griffin Edwards, Doing Their Duty: An
Empirical Analysis of the Unintended Effect of Tarasoff v. Regents on Homicidal
Activity, 57 J. L. & ECON. 321 (2014); Justin Wolfers, Did Unilateral Divorce Laws
Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 1802
(2006).  We also attempted to measure the effect of federal intervention on police
activity by duplicating Model 1, only with ln(sit), representing the natural log of the
arrest rate of various crimes per 100,000 residents.  We included these results in
Appendices D and E by way of information, but feel that arrest rates, while
helpful, are not an ideal measure of police aggressiveness, as evidenced by the
lack of statistically significant effects found in Appendices D and E.  Localities do
not report to the federal government uniform, reliable statistics on traffic stops,
Terry stops, or other forms of police behavior.
166 We used this model to calculate the effect of two different types of DOJ
interventions: public investigations and external regulation via settlement
agreements.
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may have a more significant effect on crime rates in the early
years of federal intervention while police officers are still ad-
justing to a new form of external scrutiny or regulation.  If this
is true, we may expect to see a reduction in the effect of federal
intervention over time.  To parse out any such chilling or cool-
ing effect that DOJ interventions may have on crime, we con-
sider the following model:
MODEL 2.
This formula is identical to Model 1, except that the
variable is expanded into eleven time specific treatment vari-
ables that represent the dynamic effect by year since interven-
tion.167  This allows us to determine whether the effect of
federal intervention diminishes over time.
Data for our outcome variable—crime rates—is collected
and recorded through the Uniform Crime Report (UCR).168
While the reliability of UCR data reported monthly has been
questioned,169 it has been shown to be reliable in many crimes
reported at the yearly level.170  The UCR reports the following
crimes for most agencies by year: assaults, burglary, larceny,
motor vehicle theft, murder, rape, and robbery.171
Much of what drives crime rates in each agency can be
explained by time invariant agency specific idiosyncrasies,
which we control for by the inclusion of agency fixed effects.  To
properly estimate Model 1 and Model 2, however, we must be
careful that there is not unexplained variation in our crime
outcomes that is associated with a DOJ intervention.  To try
167 This approach mirrors that used by Wolfers, supra note 165, and refined R
by Jin Young Lee & Gary Solon, The Fragility of Estimated Effects of Unilateral
Divorce Laws on Divorce Rates, 11 B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 1 (2011).  The
estimated effect that comes from Model 1 represents an average effect of interven-
tion across all treated years.  The aim of Model 2 is to relax the assumption that
each year of treatment is identical in its potential effect on crime rates.
168 See Uniform Crime Reporting Resource Guide, NACJD, http://www.icpsr
.umich.edu/icpsrweb/content/nacjd/guides/ucr.html [https://perma.cc/6SLS-
NNUZ] [hereinafter UCR, FBI].
169 See Steven D. Levitt, The Relationship Between Crime Reporting and Police:
Implications for the Use of Uniform Crime Reports, 14 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY
61, 62 (1998).
170 See generally Edwards, supra note 165 (providing a comparison between R
the UCR data on homicides and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) data on
homicides that comes from death certificate aggregation).
171 UCR, FBI, supra note 168. R
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and capture any outstanding factor that might be associated
both with crime rates and a DOJ intervention, we include a
host of control variables.  First, we include a number of control
variables that aim to capture any changes to the demographic
makeup of an agency’s jurisdiction by including the urbaniza-
tion rate, proportion of the population that is male, proportion
of the population that is non-white, and proportion of the pop-
ulation between the ages of ten and forty-nine.172  Additionally,
we include the unemployment rate and median real income of
the associated population to try and capture any sort of
changes to the economic climate of the jurisdiction.173
Lastly, since the DOJ interventions are not random in na-
ture, it is important to try and capture the agency specific
characteristics that may be driving both crime rates and the
interest of the DOJ.174  To capture this, we include several
additional control variables.  We include a count of the number
of male civilian employees and female civilian employees.175
These counts give us a good approximation of the funding
available to the agency as better-funded agencies will hire more
employees and funding cutbacks may result in the laying off of
civilian employees.176  Additionally, at the center of each DOJ
investigation is some sort of pattern of institutional miscon-
duct.  While this misconduct may manifest itself in a number of
ways, regardless of the specific nature of the misconduct, it is
likely to be associated with other types of misconduct, includ-
ing discriminatory hiring practices.  To capture this, we also
include the ratio of male to female sworn officers.177  We hope
that if there is an underlying attitude of misconduct in an
agency—an attitude that would be otherwise hard to observe—
172 We include these demographic variables in the same manner as Luis Gari-
cano & Paul Heaton, Information Technology, Organization, and Productivity in the
Public Sector: Evidence from Police Departments, 28 J. LAB. ECON. 167, 172 (2010).
When possible, each of these variables were merged with UCR crime data from the
census micro data available at ipums.org.  For missing agencies, we use county-
level demographics from John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of
Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2005).
173 These variables were collected when possible at the agency, county, and
state level, in that order, and come from Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 172. R
Missing observations were linearly interpolated and truncated at zero as needed.
174 As an example, a cutback in funding to a police department may affect
crime rates as there are fewer resources to patrol and monitor the agency jurisdic-
tion, but also may affect policing tactics that would result in a DOJ investigation.
175 See UCR, FBI, supra note 168. R
176 The UCR provides employment information on the number of male and
female civilian employees as well as male and female sworn officers. Id.
177 See id.
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that it also manifests itself, at least in part, in the hiring prac-
tices of the agency.178
III
FINDINGS
We failed to find any consistent relationship between the
introduction of mere scrutiny and crime rates.  A full break-
down of these results can be found in Appendix C.  It is impor-
tant to note that this finding does not disprove a relationship
between the introduction of external scrutiny and changes in
crime rates.  We simply lack sufficient evidence to make a de-
finitive statement either way.  We actually found that the intro-
duction of public scrutiny coincided with an apparent increase
in rates of all index crime offenses.179  However, these in-
creases in crime were, by and large, statistically insignificant—
particularly when we introduced our control variables.180  Be-
cause of our inability to make any definitive determination
about the relationship between mere scrutiny and crime rates,
we will spend the remainder of this Part evaluating the relation-
ship between external regulation and crime rates.
We found that the introduction of external regulation to a
police department via § 14141 was associated with a statisti-
cally significant increase in the frequency of several crime cate-
gories—particularly property crimes.181  This finding is
consistent with claims made by critics that external regulation
may, at least initially, make officers less aggressive or less ef-
178 It is important to note that while we control for many factors that we think
may be driving crime rates, we do not control for every conceivable factor that
explains crime rates.  Controlling for everything is impossible.  For instance, we
would have liked to control for the prevalence of drug use in each jurisdiction, but
such data is not available.  Even if it were, however, the only thing it would
achieve for us are not “better” or unbiased estimates, just more precise, or effi-
cient estimates—that is, smaller standard errors.  Correctly identifying the sign
and magnitude of our estimates hinges on capturing all the possible factors that
may influence unexplained variation in crime rates and DOJ interventions, but
does not rest on us explaining all the variation in crime rates.
179 See infra Appendix C (showing an effect of anywhere from 0.08 to 0.519).
180 See infra Appendix C.  The only crime categories in which it appears that
public scrutiny contributed to a statistically significant increase in crime were
assault, motor vehicle theft, and robberies.  An effect was also found, at least
initially, for the aggregate of all violent crimes.  But these relationships dimin-
ished once controls were added.  Only motor vehicle theft and robbery rates ap-
pear to be influenced by the introduction of public scrutiny in a manner that may
be statistically significant.
181 See infra Figure 7 (showing a statistically significant relationship between
the introduction of external regulation and increases in burglary, larceny, mur-
der, and robbery, as well as a highly significant relationship between external
regulation and increases in property crimes in the aggregate).
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fective in combatting crime.  Upon a more detailed examina-
tion, we found that this apparent uptick in crimes was
concentrated in the years immediately after the initiation of
external regulation and diminished into statistical insignifi-
cance over time.182  This suggests that external regulation may
come with growing pains.  The subparts that follow walk
through the data.
A. Trends in the Raw Data
Before discussing the results from our more sophisticated
difference-in-differences estimation strategy, it is first useful to
examine trends in the raw data.183  Does the raw data suggest
an obvious difference in crime trends in the treatment group—
that is the group influenced by federal intervention via
§ 14141—and our control jurisdictions?
To this end, Figure 3 starts by showing the trend in re-
ported crime rates for various index categories across the treat-
ment group.  The vertical line in each graph represents the
beginning of external federal regulation via § 14141.  The trend
lines before the vertical lines track the crime rates in these
treatment jurisdictions before federal intervention, and the
trend lines after track the crime rates after federal regulation.
We used a smoothing method called nonparametric regres-
sions, or local linear regressions, in drawing these trend lines.
The gray vertical lines extending upwards and downwards from
the trend lines represent the standard errors.  Since police de-
partments were subject to federal regulation at different points
in time, we adjusted the timeline to center around the year of
treatment.
182 See infra Figures 8 & 9 (showing the apparent effect of external regulation
on crime decreases into statistical insignificance over time).
183 This sort of analysis of raw trends can be useful.  For example, if the crime
trends differ substantially between the control and treatment groups, this would
suggest that federal intervention may be playing a role in this difference.  How-
ever, failure to find such an obvious disparity in the raw data does not disclose the
possibility that such a difference will emerge after more careful analysis.  For an
example of a previous empirical legal study that first relied on an analysis of raw
data before diving into a more nuanced statistical evaluation, see Cassell &
Fowles, supra note 11, at 1069–70 (looking at the raw change in clearance rates R
as potentially relevant).
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FIGURE 3.  TREND IN REPORTED CRIME RATES IN MUNICIPALITIES
SUBJECT TO FEDERAL REGULATION VIA § 14141.
Crime rates generally decline in the years after external
regulation.  While this is encouraging, it does not necessarily
suggest that federal regulation contributed to a reduction in
crime rates.  Most of these cases happened during a time when
crime in the United States was already in decline across virtu-
ally all jurisdictions—including the jurisdictions targeted for
federal regulation.184  Since the date of the first federal inter-
vention into an American police department under § 14141
(the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police) until the end of our dataset,
property and violent crime rates in the United States have dip-
ped 33.8% and 36.7% respectively.185  Figure 4 graphically il-
lustrates the change in crime rates over this time period across
all other unaffected jurisdictions in the United States, using
the same methodology described for Figure 3.
184 For a comprehensive analysis of the extent of this dramatic national crime
decline, see generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE
(2007).
185 UCR, FBI, supra note 168. R
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FIGURE 4.  TREND IN REPORTED CRIME RATES IN ALL OTHER
JURISDICTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.
Much like crime rates in the treatment group, it appears
that crime rates in the control group uniformly decline.  It is
difficult to identify any significant differences between the
treatment and control in the post-intervention crime trends
based on this simple analysis of trend lines.  Another, slightly
more fine-grained method of analysis for identifying any differ-
ences between the treatment and control groups is to calculate
the change in crime rates during the federal intervention eras
for both groups.
Figure 5 does this by comparing the change in property
crime rates in jurisdictions targeted for federal regulation with
the average change in property crime rates across the control
agencies during the same time period.  So for example, the
federal government reached a settlement with the Pittsburgh
Bureau of Police (PBP) on April 16, 1997.186  In 1996, the year
immediately before federal intervention, Pittsburgh reported
4,492.1 property crimes per 100,000 residents.187  Since then,
Pittsburgh has seen property crime rates drop by 32.3%.  By
contrast, our control agencies saw property crime rates drop by
24.3% during this same time period.  This means that Pitts-
186 See infra Appendix B.
187 UCR, FBI, supra note 168. R
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burgh saw a decline in property crimes of 8 percentage points
relative to the control group since federal intervention.  Figure
5 similarly evaluates the change in property crime rates in
jurisdictions that have been targeted by DOJ intervention
under § 14141 relative to the national average.
FIGURE 5.  CHANGE IN PROPERTY CRIME RATES IN TARGETED
JURISDICTIONS RELATIVE TO NATIONAL AVERAGE.188
Jurisdiction 
Change in 
Property  
Crime  
Rates in  
Treatment 
Change in 
Property  
Crimes  
Rates in  
Control Difference 
Beacon -20.3% -27.8% 7.5% 
Buffalo -17.3% -25.6% 8.4% 
Cincinnati 0.9% -25.6% 26.5% 
Cleveland -3.0% -26.2% 23.2% 
Columbus -15.6% -25.6% 10.1% 
Detroit -31.9% -25.9% -6.0% 
East Haven -13.5% -10.6% -2.9% 
Easton -33.6% -27.8% -5.9% 
Los Angeles -39.8% -25.5% -14.4% 
Mount Prospect -58.2% -25.9% -32.3% 
New Orleans 12.2% -9.2% 21.4% 
Pittsburgh -32.3% -24.3% -8.0% 
Prince George’s County -23.1% -26.2% 3.1% 
Seattle 19.1% -10.6% 29.7% 
Steubenville 14.0% -24.3% 38.3% 
Villa Rica 5.6% -25.9% 31.5% 
Washington -37.7% -25.5% -12.2% 
Average -16.2% -23.1% 6.9% 
188 This table calculates the change in property crime rates by measuring the
difference in crime rates in the years before federal intervention to the property
crime rates in the year that federal intervention ended.  For completed cases, this
includes the entire period of federal intervention.  For ongoing cases, we used the
most recently available crime data from 2014.  This table does not include data for
Highland Park, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.  These agencies either did not
report crime data to the FBI during these time periods, or they do not have enough
data on which to make strong conclusions.  Additionally, this table does not
include crime data from the Orange County Sheriff’s Department in Florida,
because it is not considered the primary law enforcement agency for most of that
county’s residents.  Finally, although the New Jersey State Police underwent
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While Pittsburgh might have seen property crime rates de-
crease relative to the national average, the same cannot be said
for many other jurisdictions.  Overall the results are mixed.
Since federal intervention, ten of seventeen target cities saw
property crime rates increase by more than the control group.
On average, agencies target for federal intervention saw prop-
erty crime rates increase by an average of 6.9 percentage points
more than our control group.  Figure 6 uses this same method-
ology to evaluate changes in violent crime rates.
FIGURE 6.  CHANGE IN VIOLENT CRIME RATES IN TARGETED
JURISDICTIONS RELATIVE TO NATIONAL AVERAGE.189
Jurisdiction 
Change in 
Violent  
Crime  
Rates in  
Treatment 
Change in 
Violent  
Crimes  
Rates in  
Control Difference 
Beacon -35.1% -22.6% -12.5% 
Buffalo -7.3% -17.2% 9.9% 
Cincinnati 1.5% -17.2% 18.7% 
Cleveland -1.9% -16.6% 14.7% 
Columbus -19.5% -17.2% -2.3% 
Detroit -10.5% -17.0% 6.4% 
East Haven 38.5% -5.6% 44.1% 
Easton -37.7% -22.6% -15.1% 
Los Angeles -40.5% -17.3% -23.2% 
New Orleans 19.5% -5.5% 25% 
Pittsburgh -13.2% -16.2% 3.0% 
Prince George’s County -24.9% -16.6% -8.3% 
Seattle 1.8% -5.6% 7.4% 
Steubenville -49.3% -16.2% -33.1% 
Villa Rica 10.1% -17.0% 27.1% 
Washington -37.9% -17.3% -20.6% 
Average -12.9% -15.5% 2.6% 
federal intervention in the past, this table does not include crime data for the
entire state of New Jersey, as the state police are not the primary law enforcement
unit for New Jersey residents.
189 This table calculates the change in violent crime rates by measuring the
difference in crime rates in the years before federal intervention to the violent
crime rates in the year that federal intervention ended.  For completed cases, this
includes the entire period of federal intervention.  For ongoing cases, we used the
most recently available crime data from 2014.  This table does not include data for
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The results of Figure 6 are similarly mixed.  Seven agencies
saw violent crime decrease more than the control group, while
nine agencies saw violent crime rates increase relative to the
control.  In the aggregate, violent crime rates in treatment ju-
risdictions have increased by 2.6 percentage points more than
the control group.
While somewhat helpful, this raw data has its limitations.
For one thing, if external regulation influences police behavior
and corresponding crime rates, this relationship is likely to be
dynamic over time, as discussed in subpart II.D.  For example,
regulation may have a greater effect on police behavior in the
years immediately after external regulation.  And the effects of
regulation may dwindle over time.  These tables only show a
snapshot of two moments in time—crime rates before the exter-
nal regulation in each treatment city and crime rates in those
cities today.  These tables do not capture the potentially dy-
namic effect that regulation may have on crime over the course
of this regulatory period.  Additionally, the DOJ does not select
targets for § 14141 intervention at random.190  Thus, it is pos-
sible that DOJ targets under § 14141 share a common charac-
teristic that is driving any apparent change in crime rates.  To
address these issues, the next subpart shows the results of the
difference-in-differences estimation strategy described in sub-
part II.D.
B. Difference-in-Differences Estimation Strategy
Given the indeterminacy of the raw data analysis, a differ-
ence-in-differences estimation strategy, outlined as Model 1 in
subpart II.D., serves as a unique methodology for teasing out
the likely relationship between external regulation and result-
ing crime rates in treatment municipalities, relative to the con-
trol group—controlling for the variables discussed in subpart
II.D.  Figure 7 shows the results of this difference-in-difference
Mount Prospect, Highland Park, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.  These
agencies either did not report crime data to the FBI during these time periods, or
they do not have enough data on which to make strong conclusions.  Additionally,
this table does not include crime data from the Orange County Sheriff’s
Department in Florida, because it is not considered the primary law enforcement
agencies for most of that county’s residents.  Finally, although the New Jersey
State Police underwent federal intervention in the past, this table does not include
crime data for the entire state of New Jersey, as the state police are not the
primary law enforcement unit for New Jersey residents.
190 Although, it is worth noting that scholars have been critical of how seem-
ingly random selection for § 14141 reform can be.  One scholar even described a
municipality getting selected for § 14141 regulation as “akin to winning a terrible
lottery.”  Rushin, supra note 25, at 3194. R
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estimation strategy.  The “Regulation” column shows the per-
centage change in various crime rates in treatment jurisdic-
tions attributable to the introduction of external regulation.
For each crime category, we include two rows.  The top row
shows the outcome of this regression without including the
control variables.  The lower row includes these control
variables.
FIGURE 7.  EFFECT OF EXTERNAL REGULATION ON CRIME RATES.191
Regulation SE R2 N Controls 
Assaults 0.239 (0.157) 0.74 62,288
  0.180 (0.151) 0.74 55,072 X
Burglary 0.272† (0.133) 0.85 62,979
  0.264^ (0.137) 0.86 55,700 X
Larceny 0.094 (0.068) 0.88 62,976
  0.196^ (0.107) 0.88 55,697 X
Motor Vehicle  0.491† (0.218) 0.72 63,062
Theft 0.201 (0.168) 0.74 55,767 X
Murder 0.220† (0.108) 0.66 30,000
  0.211^ (0.129) 0.67 26,057 X
Rape 0.056 (0.169) 0.60 53,626
  0.098 (0.214) 0.62 47,471 X
Robbery 0.677† (0.304) 0.75 59,189
  0.386^ (0.235) 0.76 52,270 X
Violent 0.374† (0.169) 0.76 60,406
Crimes 0.234 (0.175) 0.76 53,498 X
Property 0.162‡ (0.068) 0.89 62,980
Crimes 0.254‡ (0.109) 0.89 55,701 X
The difference-in-differences estimation strategy reveals
that in many of these crime categories, federal intervention
seemed to coincide with a statistically significant uptick in re-
ported crime rates, relative to the control jurisdictions.  This
relationship appears to be statistically significant in property
and street crimes like burglary, motor vehicle theft, and rob-
bery—i.e., criminal activity that is likely sensitive to situational
191 Each row represents a unique regression.  Each observation is at the
agency-year level.  The dependent variable (reported crime rate) is expressed in
the natural log of each respective rate and the standard errors are clustered at the
agency level.  Regressions including the controls listed supra subpart II.D.
^p < 0.10, †p < 0.05, ‡p < 0.01.
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deterrents like aggressive street policing.  This finding is con-
sistent with claims made by proponents of the de-policing
hypothesis.
In order to breakdown the relationship between external
regulation and changes in crime rates over time, we estimate
Model 2 in subpart II.D.  Figures 8 and 9 represent the results
of Model 2 that attempts to measure the effect of the DOJ
initiated federal intervention in our treatment cities.  In the
resulting figures, each data point represents the estimated ef-
fect of external regulation in that year on the crime rate in the
treatment group.  The dashed lines extending upwards and
downwards from the trend lines in each figure represent a 90%
confidence bound.192  This allows a reader to quickly identify
whether a particular data point is statistically significant.  If
the dotted line includes both positive and negative outcomes,
then we cannot say with confidence whether external regula-
tion had any particular effect on crime rates in that year.  How-
ever, if the dotted line is entirely above or below zero, then we
can say with some confidence that external regulation likely
had either a positive or negative effect on crime rates.
FIGURE 8.  PERCENTAGE CHANGE BY YEAR IN PROPERTY CRIME
RATES IN JURISDICTIONS TARGETED FOR FEDERAL
INTERVENTION.
192 The idea is that we can be 90% confident that the “true” value of the trend
line lies somewhere between the upper and lower bound.
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FIGURE 9.  PERCENTAGE CHANGE BY YEAR IN VIOLENT CRIME RATES
IN JURISDICTIONS TARGETED FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION.
Figures 8 and 9 suggest that any effects of external regula-
tion on crime rates are strongest in the years immediately after
federal intervention.  By years five through eight, it appears
that any apparent relationship between external regulation
and crime rates diminishes into statistical insignificance.  This
suggests that any negative de-policing effects of external regu-
lation may be frontloaded.
While this data provide compelling support for the de-polic-
ing hypothesis, they fail to answer many important questions.
Though these data suggest that § 14141 interventions may be
associated with a temporary uptick in reported crime, they do
not necessarily suggest that all regulations of law enforcement
will similarly result in de-policing.  Although the result of this
study should be more generalizable than some other previous
studies, we cannot necessarily say with a high level of certainty
which types of legal regulations contribute most significantly to
the de-policing effects observed in this Article.  The findings
from this study represent an incremental, but important step
in understanding the real costs associated with police regula-
tion.  The next Part will consider the implications of these
findings.
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IV
CONSTITUTIONAL POLICING AND COMPROMISE
The core finding in this Article—that external regulation of
American law enforcement agencies through § 14141 appears
to be associated with a temporary uptick in some reported
crime rates—has important implications for the study of crimi-
nal procedure and policing.  It suggests that external regula-
tion may come with unforeseen costs.  This study, though, only
provides a limited insight into the world of de-policing.  It leaves
many important questions unanswered.  For instance, what
component of external regulation via § 14141 is driving this
apparent, short-term increase in crime rates within targeted
jurisdictions?  And can we improve the use of § 14141 to re-
duce this de-policing effect?  Subpart A considers some possi-
ble explanations for the uptick in crime.  Subpart B highlights
some important limitations of this study.  Subpart C then offers
some normative recommendations for how policymakers could
potentially alleviate the de-policing effects of police regulation.
A. Possible Explanations for the Apparent Uptick in
Reported Crime
This Article can only claim to show a relationship between
the introduction of external regulation and an apparent uptick
in reported crime rates.  The important question, though, is
what exactly is driving this uptick in reported crime?  One pos-
sibility is that external regulation—in this case, 42 U.S.C.
§ 14141 reforms—are inherently cumbersome.  Under this
view, no matter how they are implemented, external regula-
tions may always come with some de-policing costs.  For exam-
ple, in Pittsburgh—one of the cities where outside researchers
compiled qualitative data from frontline officers in the wake of
externally mandated reforms—frontline officers complained
that accountability “increased to the point that officers are al-
most afraid to say anything in fear of punishment.”193  This is
in part because the external reforms ensured that “[e]very inci-
dent now has a paper trail.” In Los Angeles a stunning 70% of
officers agreed with the statement that “paper work deters of-
ficers from making arrests,” and even more—79%—believed
that, as a result, external regulation impeded the LAPD’s ability
to fight crime.194  Officers in Pittsburgh shared this sentiment,
193 CAN FEDERAL INTERVENTION BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING?,
supra note 53, at 21. R
194 STONE ET AL., supra note 81, at 19. R
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with an officer telling researchers that after the beginning of
external regulation, “[o]fficers spend too much time doing
paperwork as opposed to doing their job.”195 Another way that
external regulations could be inherently cumbersome is that
the heightened threat of discipline could make police officers
less proactive in doing their jobs.  A whopping 93% of LAPD
officers agreed with the statement that “the threat of commu-
nity complaints prevents police officers from being proactive on
the street,”196 while 89% believed that “because of fear of being
unfairly disciplined, many LAPD officers are not proactive in
doing their jobs.”197
If true, this explanation would have the most far reaching
implications, as it would suggest that that police regulations
designed to combat misconduct by their very nature may come
with de-policing side effects.  But in our estimation, this expla-
nation seems somewhat unlikely, given the fact that the de-
policing effects of external regulation diminish into statistical
insignificance over time.198  Were these regulations so inher-
ently cumbersome that they would cause de-policing, we would
expect the de-policing effects to continue after the first few
years of DOJ intervention.
This raises another possible explanation for the apparent
uptick in crime rates after federal intervention: growing pains.
It may be that when frontline officers are faced with new and
potentially unpopular external regulations, their first reaction
is to temporarily pull back or reduce enforcement until they
195 CAN FEDERAL INTERVENTION BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING?,
supra note 53, at 25. R
196 STONE ET AL., supra note 81, at 19. R
197 Id.  The Stone et al. study elaborated that:
In focus groups, officers commonly said they sometimes avoid con-
tact with citizens and “look the other way” when observing illegal
behavior in order not to create additional work for themselves or
provoke the intervention of a sergeant or watch commander.  They
also said they are “timid” in encounters with suspects or handle
them with “kid gloves” in order to avoid generating a use-of-force
report, inciting a complaint, or triggering an action item (or a “red-
flag”) in the computer system that monitors officer performance.
Id.
Further, the Pittsburgh study quoted one officer who said that “[m]ost officers
are not aggressive with people who are breaking the law.  Officers are afraid that
people will complain of their civil rights being violated.” CAN FEDERAL INTERVENTION
BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING?, supra note 53, at 20. R
198 If municipalities commonly disregarded § 14141 reforms shortly after im-
plementation, this might explain the diminishing de-policing effect over time.  But
the best available evidence suggests that agencies mostly retain § 14141 reforms
after the DOJ ends it oversight.  Given this evidence, we are hesitant to believe
that the diminishing effects of § 14141 reforms are the result of agencies dropping
§ 14141 reforms over time.
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fully understand the implications of these regulations.  One
recurring theme in interviews with frontline officers in targeted
municipalities is that they continually complained about “low
morale.”199  As an officer in Los Angeles explained, external
regulation “hurt their pride [and] hurt their morale,” thereby
contributing to a reduction in officer productivity.200  Officers
that were once “go-getters” slowed down in the face of this
reduction in officer morale.201  One possible explanation for
this reduction in morale is that officers felt as if the process
used to establish these regulations was procedurally unfair.  As
one officer in Pittsburgh elaborated, “[p]atrol officers directly
affected by the [external regulations] were never given the op-
portunity to make positive changes in department policy.  [The
external regulations were] implemented by supervisors that did
not participate in patrol functions or understand the day-to-
day routines of street patrol work.”202
Two other possible explanations are worth mentioning as
well.  First, it may be that the publicly visible, external regula-
tion of a police department emboldens criminals.  As one officer
in Pittsburgh remarked, “I think the decree limited officers’
ability to perform their jobs.  And criminals know this and take
advantage.”203  This explanation focuses less on the reaction of
the police officers to external regulation and more on the sig-
naling effect of external regulation to would-be criminals.
Second, the effect we see in this study may not be the
result of an increase in actual crime, but rather the result of an
increase in reported crimes.  Such an increase in the reporting
of crime could happen in a couple different ways.  It could be
that before federal intervention, citizens were hesitant to report
criminal activity to police.  Or it could be that before federal
intervention, police departments did not properly record re-
ports of criminal activity.  In either case, though, we would
expect to see the kind of statistical patterns observed in Figures
7 through 9.
If true, this explanation would suggest that there might be
no relationship at all between external regulation and actual
crime rates.  This explanation would be consistent with a re-
cent study by Matthew Desmond, Andrew Papachristos, and
199 TURNING NECESSITY INTO VIRTUE, supra note 53, at 63. R
200 STONE ET AL., supra note 81, at 19. R
201 CAN FEDERAL INTERVENTION BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING?,
supra note 53, at 24. R
202 Id.
203 Id. at 21–22.
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David Kirk, who used an interrupted time series analysis to
show that members of the Milwaukee community—particularly
residents of mostly black neighborhoods—were less likely to
report crime to the police after a highly publicized incident of
police brutality.204  Other studies have similarly argued that
incidents of visible police misconduct lead to legal cynicism
within black communities in particular.205
In our estimation, this proves to be the most compelling
alternative explanation for the statistical trend observed in this
Article.  Ultimately, though, we view this alterative explanation
as somewhat less likely than the de-policing hypothesis.  For
one thing, virtually none of the DOJ investigations found the
failure to properly document crimes as a major problem in
communities targeted for federal intervention.206  This is not to
say that federal intervention may nonetheless contribute to
improved internal recordkeeping.207  Federal settlements,
though, have not focused on the proper recordation of reported
crimes.  Finally, while we have no doubt that highly visible
incidents of police brutality could spur a change in the willing-
ness of citizens to report crime to the police, we remain some-
what less convinced that news of federal investigations and
settlements reach the average citizen or have the same power to
change citizen behavior.
B. Limitations of the Data
Before considering the normative implications of the de-
policing hypothesis, it is first important to fully recognize the
limitations of the data used in this study.  First, even though
204 Matthew Desmond, Andrew V. Papachristos & David S. Kirk, Police Vio-
lence and Citizen Crime Reporting in the Black Community, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 857,
858 (2016).
205 See, e.g., ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDUR-
ING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT (2012) (discussing the relationship between police mis-
conduct and crime rates); David S. Kirk & Andrew V. Papachristos, Cultural
Mechanisms and the Persistence of Neighborhood Violence, 116 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY
1190 (2011) (arguing that legal cynicism leads to increased neighborhood vio-
lence); Ronald Weitzer, Incidents of Police Misconduct and Public Opinion, 30 J.
CRIM. JUST. 397, 398 (2002) (noting the effects that “highly publicized incidents of
police misconduct” have on crime).
206 The closest we could find to a DOJ finding that a municipality failed to
document crime rates properly was the case in Missoula, Montana, where the
DOJ alleged a failure on the part of local law enforcement to respond to certain sex
crimes.  For a detailed examination of this case and its implications for the future
of policing litigation, see Deborah Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement as Unqual Pro-
tection, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1287, 1322 (2016).
207 For example, it is not uncommon for consent decrees to discuss the proper
method for collecting citizen complaints. See supra note 127 and accompanying R
text (describing consent decrees that deal with this subject).
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federal settlements look reasonably similar from one munici-
pality to the next, the kind of reforms that the DOJ has de-
manded in cases of federal intervention has changed somewhat
over time.  Perhaps most noticeably, the DOJ has appeared to
expand the range of topics covered in some recent consent
decrees, like that in New Orleans.208  This makes it difficult to
say with any certainty which types of external reforms man-
dated by federal intervention most contribute to apparent de-
policing.
Second, because federal intervention is such a major, dis-
ruptive form of external regulation, readers should use caution
when making generalizable conclusions about the broader re-
lationship between external regulations and de-policing based
on the data from this Article.  As discussed in subpart II.C, the
scope of these settlements means that federal intervention is
where we would most expect to find de-policing happening.
Readers should be cautious, though, in assuming that other
limited forms of external regulation, like criminal procedure
cases handed down by the Supreme Court, would similarly
contribute to de-policing.  The apparent de-policing found in
this article may be the result of frontline officers rejecting the
content of external regulations.  It may also be the result of
frontline officers pushing back against the failure of the DOJ to
take into account frontline officer opinions in crafting these
external regulations, or it may be the result of some other part
of the federal intervention process that we are not fully consid-
ering.  In any case, readers should view the results of this study
for what they are: one data point in what will hopefully be a
growing literature on the relationship between police regula-
tion, officer behavior, and crime rates.
C. Limiting the De-Policing Effects of Regulation
So where do we go from here?  How can policymakers in-
stall necessary external regulations to protect constitutional
rights without contributing to de-policing?  If regulations de-
signed to protect constitutional rights are so inherently bur-
densome that they will always lead to de-policing, there may be
little that policymakers can do.  Under this view, constitutional
policing may be a compromise—the protection of civil rights at
the expense of safety.  But in our estimation, the data from this
study does not necessarily support this conclusion.  It seems
208 New Orleans Consent Decree, supra note 129 (laying out one of the most R
expansive federal consent decrees binding a police department under § 14141 in
American history).
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more likely that external regulation of law enforcement comes
with growing pains.  Frontline officers may find the imposition
of external mandates to be procedurally unjust.  They may find
their lack of voice in this regulatory process to be frustrating.
Or frontline officers may initially (and rationally) respond to
new disciplinary mechanisms with an abundance of caution.
All of these sorts of growing pains may contribute to de-policing
in the years immediately after federal intervention, but seem to
diminish over time—perhaps as frontline officers come to ac-
cept the newly installed regulatory measures as the new nor-
mal.  So how can external regulation of police departments be
improved to reduce or eliminate these sorts of growing pains?
One way is that external regulators like the DOJ could
incorporate frontline officers in the development and imple-
mentation of accountability measures.  Professor Kami Chavis
Simmons has made similar arguments in her previous writings
on § 14141.209  Professors Catherine Fisk and L. Song Richard-
son have similarly argued that the incorporation of frontline
officers into the development of departmental policies and pro-
cedures can reduce resistance from frontline officers.210
Currently, the DOJ does little to incorporate frontline of-
ficers into the development of § 14141 settlement agreements.
The DOJ normally negotiates reforms exclusively with the
targeted municipality and forces the police union to accept
whatever disciplinary measures are developed via this closed-
door process.211  Thus, the DOJ may be able to reduce the
growing pains of external regulation by including police union
officials or other frontline officer stakeholders into the process
of negotiating § 14141 reforms.212  By including such stake-
209 Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Col-
laboration in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 489, 520 (2008).
210 Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 10–11, 52–53) (on file with authors) (ex-
plaining that when police departments implement policies on officers without
adequate consultation, frontline officers may feel “compelled to oppose new poli-
cies for fear that the policy will be implemented punitively or unfairly as a way to
discipline rank and file who are unpopular with management,” and further ex-
plaining how “failing to give [frontline officers] any voice” in designing internal
policies may fuel resentment because it communicates to them “just how unim-
portant their views” are and “just how low their status” is within the department).
211 See, e.g., David Rosenzweig, Police Union Loses Bid for Role in Consent
Decree, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/jan/09/lo-
cal/me-10218 [https://perma.cc/JZV5-GRHF] (describing the court order deny-
ing the Los Angeles Police Protective League’s motion to intervene in the DOJ’s
negotiations with the municipality).
212 See Simmons, supra note 209, at 524 (explaining that “[p]olice reform R
efforts are doomed to fail without significant cooperation of the police officers
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holders in § 14141 settlement negotiations, the DOJ may be
able to improve the perceived legitimacy of the external regula-
tion, create feelings of “ownership” within rank-and-file of-
ficers, thereby “increas[ing] their commitment to its successful
implementation.”213  As Professor Simmons has argued, “[t]his
enhanced legitimacy could have positive implications for police
reform efforts because if those responsible for implementing
police services embrace the reform efforts rather than lobby
against requirements they view as illegitimately imposed upon
them, they are more likely to participate in the implementation
process.”214
While this more inclusive approach to police regulation
may seem appealing, it would ultimately present its own
problems.  Past research has argued that one of the reasons
that § 14141 regulation is so effective at combatting police mis-
conduct is that it prioritizes the reduction of police miscon-
duct.215  Police unions “commonly attempt to intervene” in
§ 14141 settlement negations between police departments and
the DOJ.216  Courts have almost uniformly rejected such re-
quests.217  In interviews, police administrators have suggested
that this exclusion of police unions makes § 14141 litigation a
“particularly successful accountability tool” because the collec-
tive bargaining process often “restrains their ability to imple-
ment accountability measures.”218  Police unions have
previously resisted a range of policies designed to fight police
misconduct, including civilian review boards, disciplinary pro-
cedures, and changes in departmental directives.219  This re-
themselves, thus providing further justification for ensuring the participation of
rank-and-file officers” in the negotiation process).
213 Id. at 538 (quoting Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Adminis-
trative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 24 (1997)).
214 Id.
215 See Rushin, supra note 18, at 1404 (describing how § 14141 provides R
police chiefs and the DOJ with legal cover to implement potentially unpopular
reforms over the objection of frontline police officer unions).
216 Id. at 1376; see also Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L. J.
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 46–48) (on file with authors) (describing how
police union contracts have been a source of contention during § 14141 cases).
217 See id.  In addition, Kami Simmons has argued that frontline officer partici-
pation in these negotiations may have other benefits.  It may increase the officers’
willingness to cooperate with the proposed remedy, as well as improve the sub-
stantive outcomes by incorporating different voices. See Simmons, supra note
209, at 538–39; see also Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of Participation, 78 IOWA L. R
REV. 981, 983 (1993) (exploring the value of participation in the consent decree
formation process and in public law litigation generally).
218 Rushin, supra note 18, at 1376. R
219 See Colleen Kadleck & Lawrence F. Travis, III, Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Police
Department and Police Officer Association Leaders’ Perceptions of Community
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sistance to oversight by police unions is understandable: “An
organized labor unit designed to enhance working conditions
for its members should rationally want to block such
changes. . . .”220  As a result, the DOJ may not be inclined to
include police unions in its negotiations in § 14141 cases, if it
believes that police unions are more concerned about enhanc-
ing working conditions for their members than striking the
appropriate balance of accountability measures to ensure con-
stitutionally acceptable policing practices.  This sort of cooper-
ative rulemaking may also produce inferior reforms.221
CONCLUSION
In August 2014, a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri shot
and killed an unarmed black teenager named Michael
Brown.222  The protests that followed ignited a national conver-
sation about the disproportionate effects of police misconduct
on racial minorities.  It does not appear that this debate will go
away anytime soon, as the deaths of Tamir Rice,223 Eric Gar-
ner,224 Walter Scott,225 and Laquan McDonald226 at the hands
of police have continued to fuel calls for police reform.  As this
debate rages on, police in the United States have come under
Policing: Describing the Nature and Extent of Agreement 3–4 (2004), https://www
.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/226315.pdf [https://perma.cc/WVW8-2C22].
Other scholars have also discussed how collective bargaining affects police de-
partments. See, e.g., Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98
MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2205–17 (2014) (identifying three ways in which collective
bargaining impacts policing).
220 Rushin, supra note 18, at 1376. R
221 See Simmons, supra note 209, at 541–42; see also Andrew P. Morriss et R
al., Choosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 198 (2005) (raising
some of the arguments against regulatory negotiation).
222 See Bosman & Fitzsimmons, supra note 12 (providing details on the R
Michael Brown shooting).
223 See Emma G. Fitzsimmons, 12-Year-Old Boy Dies After Police in Cleveland
Shoot Him, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/
us/boy-12-dies-after-being-shot-by-cleveland-police-officer.html [https://perma
.cc/M2ZN-SFTK] (describing the police shooting of twelve-year-old Tamir Rice in
Cleveland).
224 See Martin Kaste, System for Reporting Police Killings Unreliable, Study
Finds, NPR (Mar. 6, 2015, 4:26 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/06/
391269342/system-for-reporting-police-killings-unreliable-study-finds [https://
perma.cc/DM4N-32AE] (reporting on police shooting of Eric Garner in New York).
225 See Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer is Charged
with Murder of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (April 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/04/08/us/south-carolina-officer-is-charged-with-murder-in-black-mans-
death.html [https://perma.cc/RYL6-BHG4] (describing the shooting death of
Walter Scott by a North Charleston police officer, which was caught on a cell
phone camera).
226 See Davey & Smith, supra note 23 (describing the shooting of Laquan R
McDonald by a Chicago police officer).
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intense public scrutiny and increased external regulation.  The
DOJ has also responded by more aggressively enforcing civil
rights statutes against police departments.227  Critics have
worried that this additional oversight may cause police to be
less aggressive, thereby increasing crime.  This Article demon-
strates that such a de-policing phenomenon is not entirely im-
plausible.  At least one form of external regulation of American
law enforcement—§ 14141 intervention—is associated with a
temporary surge in certain crime rates.  Questions remain
about the generalizability of this finding to all regulatory con-
texts.  More research will be needed in the future to identify
which types of regulations are most closely tied with de-polic-
ing.  These findings represent an important recognition of the
possible negative side effects associated with external regula-
tion of American law enforcement.  These findings should not
necessarily deter policymakers from enacting regulations of lo-
cal police departments.  Even if external regulations contribute
to some temporary de-policing, this may be the cost of ensuring
that police departments adhere to constitutional minimums.
Constitutional policing may sometimes require compromise.
227 Historically, the DOJ has only reached around one § 14141 settlement
every year.  But in 2014 and 2015, the DOJ reached seven settlements—far out-
pacing most previous years. See infra Appendix B.
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APPENDIX A.  INVESTIGATIONS OF AMERICAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS
CONDUCTED BY U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
UNDER § 14141.
Agency Name Opened Closed Re-Opened State
Torrance Police Department 5/1/95 9/14/98 CA
Adelanto Police Department 6/16/95 9/14/98 CA
Steubenville Police Department 7/31/95 3/3/05 OH
Pittsburgh Police Department 4/11/96 6/16/05 PA
New Orleans Police Department 4/15/96 3/23/04 5/14/10 LA
New Jersey State Police 4/15/96 10/26/09 NJ
Illinois State Police 4/15/96 9/27/02 IL
Montgomery County Police Department 6/1/96 2/1/05 MD
Los Angeles Police Department 7/31/96 5/16/13 CA
Beverly Hills Police Department 8/12/96 11/14/00 CA
New York City Police Department (Eastern
8/21/97 12/23/04 NY
District)
Buffalo Police Department 12/9/97 7/9/08 NY
Columbus Police Department 3/13/98 5/14/04 OH
Eastpointe Police Department 3/20/98 1/12/05 MI
District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
1/31/99 2/10/12 DC
Department
New York City Police Department (Southern
3/17/99 3/31/05 NY
District)
Charleston Police Department 3/31/99 11/12/03 WV
Riverside Police Department 6/29/99 3/26/07 CA
Prince George’s County Police Department 7/1/99 1/13/09 MD
Cleveland Division of Police 10/1/99 3/15/05 3/14/13 OH
Mount Prospect Police Department 4/5/00 12/28/06 IL
Highland Park Police Department 5/18/00 12/7/04 IL
Tulsa Police Department 2/8/01 7/21/08 OK
Cincinnati Police Department 5/7/01 4/12/07 OH
Detroit Police Department 5/29/01 3/2/16 MI
Schenectady Police Department 4/4/02 1/9/13 NY
Portland Police Department 5/6/02 6/27/05 ME
Miami Police Department 5/31/02 5/19/06 10/11/11 FL
Providence Police Department 12/11/02 3/26/08 RI
Villa Rica Police Department 1/27/03 12/23/06 GA
Alabaster Police Department 3/4/03 9/7/05 AL
Bakersfield Police Department 6/24/03 1/25/08 CA
Virgin Islands Police Department 2/13/04 VI
Beacon Police Department 8/3/04 NY
Warren Police Department 11/29/04 OH
Easton Police Department 10/14/05 7/1/15 PA
Orange County Sheriff’s Office 1/10/07 4/4/13 FL
Austin Police Department 5/25/07 5/27/11 TX
Yonkers Police Department 7/24/07 NY
4/30/08 PRPuerto Rico Police Department
Harvey Police Department 9/5/08 1/24/12 IL
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Lorain Police Department 11/20/08 5/22/12 OH
Escambia County Sheriff’s Office 12/30/08 10/14/12 FL
Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department 3/10/09 AZ
Inglewood Police Department 3/11/09 10/1/15 CA
Suffolk County Police Department 9/9/09 NY
East Haven Police Department 9/30/09 CT
Alamance County Sheriff’s Department 6/2/10 NC
Seattle Police Department 3/31/11 WA
Newark Police Department 5/9/11 NJ
Portland Police Department 6/7/11 OR
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
8/19/11 CA
(Antelope Valley)
Meridian Police Department 11/29/11 MS
Missoula Police Department 4/25/12 5/11/15 MT
University of Montana Office of Public Safety 4/25/12 7/10/15 MT
Albuquerque Police Department 11/27/12 NM
Cleveland Police Department 3/14/13 OH
Ferguson Police Department 9/4/14 MO
Evangeline Parish Sheriff’s Department 4/21/15 LA
Villa Plate Police Department 4/21/15 LA
Baltimore Police Department 5/8/15 MD
Chicago Police Department 12/7/15 IL
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APPENDIX B.  AGREEMENTS BETWEEN U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
AND AMERICAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS UNDER § 14141.
Agreement
Agency Date Close Date
Pittsburgh Police Department 4/16/97 6/16/05
Steubenville Police Department 9/3/97 3/3/05
New Jersey State Police 12/29/99 10/26/09
District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department 6/13/01 2/10/12
Los Angeles Police Department 6/15/01 5/16/13
Highland Park Police Department 7/11/01 12/7/04
Cincinnati Police Department 4/12/02 4/12/07
Columbus Police Department 9/4/02 5/14/04
Buffalo Police Department 9/19/02 7/8/08
Mount Prospect Police Department 1/22/03 12/28/06
Detroit Police Department (1) 6/12/03 3/2/16
Detroit Police Department (2) 7/18/03 12/23/06
Villa Rica Police Department 12/23/03 12/23/06
Prince George’s County Police Department (1) 1/22/04 1/13/09
Cleveland Division of Police 2/11/04 3/15/05
Prince George’s County Police Department (2) 3/11/04 3/12/07
Virgin Islands Police Department 3/23/09
Easton Police Department 9/8/10 7/1/15
Orange County Sheriff’s Office 9/16/10 4/4/13
Beacon Police Department 12/23/10
Warren Police Department 1/26/12
Seattle Police Department 9/21/12
East Haven Police Department 12/21/12
New Orleans Police Department 1/11/13
Missoula Police Department 5/15/13 5/11/15
Puerto Rico Police Department 7/17/13
Suffolk County Police Department 1/1/14
University of Montana Police Department 6/10/14 7/10/15
Portland Police Department 8/29/14
Albuquerque Police Department 11/14/14
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (Antelope Valley) 4/29/15
Cleveland Police Department 5/26/15
Meridian Police Department 6/19/15
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APPENDIX C.  EFFECT OF PUBLIC SCRUTINY ON CRIME RATES.228
Scrutiny SE R2 N Controls
Assaults 0.321† (0.162) 0.74 62,288
0.220 (0.136) 0.74 55,072 X
Burglary 0.252 (0.189) 0.85 62,979
0.226 (0.189) 0.86 55,700 X
Larceny 0.141 (0.201) 0.88 62,976
0.207 (0.221) 0.88 55,697 X
Motor Vehicle 0.435‡ (0.151) 0.72 63,062
Theft 0.212^ (0.113) 0.74 55,767 X
Murder 0.218 (0.154) 0.66 30,000
0.211 (0.143) 0.67 26,057 X
Rape 0.092 (0.079) 0.60 53,626
0.080 (0.101) 0.62 47,471 X
Robbery 0.519‡ (0.196) 0.75 59,189
0.303^ (0.165) 0.76 52,270 X
Violent 0.337† (0.160) 0.76 60,406
Crimes 0.179 (0.126) 0.76 53,498 X
Property 0.204 (0.247) 0.89 62,980
Crimes 0.265 (0.268) 0.89 55,701 X
APPENDIX D.  EFFECT OF PUBLIC SCRUTINY ON RATE OF ARRESTS
PER CRIME REPORTED.229
Scrutiny SE R2 N Controls
Assaults -0.120 (0.121) 0.69 56,813
-0.093 (0.105) 0.69 51,653 X
Burglary -0.061 (0.136) 0.64 57,713
-0.085 (0.131) 0.65 52,441 X
Larceny -0.379^ (0.211) 0.76 58,608
-0.274 (0.169) 0.77 53,277 X
Motor Vehicle -0.252 (0.219) 0.62 52,296
Theft -0.203 (0.190) 0.63 47,406 X
Murder -0.048 (0.059) 0.75 22,060
-0.035 (0.057) 0.75 19,866 X
Rape -0.195^ (0.106) 0.66 37,978
-0.161 (0.113) 0.66 34,528 X
Robbery -0.132 (0.088) 0.71 47,783
-0.121 (0.082) 0.71 43,508 X
Violent -0.054 (0.080) 0.80 19,248
Crimes -0.046 (0.068) 0.80 17,364 X
Property -0.223 (0.154) 0.78 51,259
Crimes -0.161 (0.125) 0.79 46,466 X
228 Each row represents a unique regression.  Each observation is at the
agency-year level.  The dependent variable (reported crime rate) is expressed in
the natural log of each respective rate and the standard errors are clustered at the
agency level.  Regressions include the controls listed supra subpart II.D.
^p < 0.10, †p < 0.05, ‡p < 0.01.
229 Id. ^p < 0.10, †p < 0.05, ‡p < 0.01.
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APPENDIX E.  EFFECT OF EXTERNAL REGULATION ON RATE OF
ARRESTS PER INDEX CRIME.230
Scrutiny SE R2 N Controls
Assaults -0.102 (0.259) 0.69 56,813
-0.091 (0.251) 0.69 51,653 X
Burglary -0.085 (0.185) 0.64 57,713
-0.096 (0.159) 0.65 52,441 X
Larceny -0.409 (0.316) 0.76 58,608
-0.283 (0.279) 0.77 53,277 X
Motor Vehicle -0.015 (0.207) 0.62 52,296
Theft 0.088 (0.201) 0.63 47,406 X
Murder -0.186 (0.136) 0.75 22,060
-0.157 (0.137) 0.75 19,866 X
Rape -0.276 (0.216) 0.65 58,218
-0.246 (0.204) 0.66 52,924 X
Robbery -0.242^ (0.145) 0.66 37,978
-0.180 (0.153) 0.66 34,528 X
Violent -0.124 (0.159) 0.71 47,783
Crimes -0.111 (0.157) 0.71 43,508 X
Property -0.249 (0.215) 0.80 19,248
Crimes -0.246 (0.227) 0.80 17,364 X
APPENDIX F.  EXPLANATION OF COLLECTION OF UNIQUE DATASET OF
ALL 42 U.S.C. § 14141 CASES.
This Article collected an original dataset including all in-
vestigations and interventions by the DOJ pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 14141.  To do so, the authors first submitted a Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Civil Rights Divi-
sion of the United States Department of Justice.  The authors
then followed this request up by conducting semi-structured
interviews with a number of stakeholders involved in the imple-
mentation of § 14141 cases.231  The purpose of these interviews
was to both build a descriptive account of how the DOJ en-
forces § 14141 and to ensure the completeness of data ac-
quired via the FOIA request.  The authors also searched media
accounts and court records to further verify the completeness
of the dataset used in this study.
230 Id. ^p < 0.10 †p < 0.05 ‡p < 0.01.
231 In total, this Article relies on thirty-five in-depth, semi-structured inter-
views.  It is common for qualitative studies to use semi-structured interviews.  In
this study, the interview participants fell into three different categories: DOJ
litigators, external monitors, and police officials.  These interview participants
generally requested anonymity, given their continued work in this field.  For some
examples of semi-structured interviews in legal scholarship, see Avlana Eisen-
berg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 919 (2014); Keith Guzik, The
Agencies of Abuse: Intimate Abusers’ Experience of Presumptive Arrest and Prose-
cution, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 111, 115 (2008).  During semi-structured interviews,
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a researcher will normally ask a participant a set of pre-arranged questions.  The
researcher will then ask unplanned follow-up questions to help the researcher
gain a more detailed understanding of the participant’s responses. See Eisenberg,
supra, at 919.
